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Giorgi Japaridze
Abstract
“Clarithmetic” is a generic name for formal number theories similar to Peano arithmetic, but based
on computability logic instead of the more traditional classical or intuitionistic logics. Formulas of clar-
ithmetical theories represent interactive computational problems, and their “truth” is understood as
existence of an algorithmic solution. Imposing various complexity constraints on such solutions yields
various versions of clarithmetic. The present paper introduces a system of clarithmetic for polynomial
time computability, which is shown to be sound and complete. Sound in the sense that every theorem T
of the system represents an interactive number-theoretic computational problem with a polynomial time
solution and, furthermore, such a solution can be efficiently extracted from a proof of T . And complete in
the sense that every interactive number-theoretic problem with a polynomial time solution is represented
by some theorem T of the system. The paper is written in a semitutorial style and targets readers with
no prior familiarity with computability logic.
MSC: primary: 03F50; secondary: 03F30; 03D75; 03D15; 68Q10; 68T27; 68T30
Keywords: Computability logic; Interactive computation; Implicit computational complexity; Game seman-
tics; Peano arithmetic; Bounded arithmetic
1 Introduction
Computability logic (CoL), introduced in [13, 17, 26], is a semantical, mathematical and philosophical plat-
form, and a long-term program, for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to
the formal theory of truth which logic has more traditionally been. Under the approach of CoL, formulas
represent computational problems, and their “truth” is seen as algorithmic solvability. In turn, computa-
tional problems — understood in their most general, interactive sense — are defined as games played by a
machine against its environment, with “algorithmic solvability” meaning existence of a machine that wins
the game against any possible behavior of the environment. And an open-ended collection of the most basic
and natural operations on computational problems forms the logical vocabulary of the theory. With this
semantics, CoL provides a systematic answer to the fundamental question “what can be computed?”, just
as classical logic is a systematic tool for telling what is true. Furthermore, as it turns out, in positive cases
“what can be computed” always allows itself to be replaced by “how can be computed”, which makes CoL of
potential interest in not only theoretical computer science, but many applied areas as well, including interac-
tive knowledge base systems, resource oriented systems for planning and action, or declarative programming
languages.
While potential applications have been repeatedly pointed out in earlier papers on CoL, so far all tech-
nical efforts had been mainly focused on finding axiomatizations for various fragments of this semantically
conceived and inordinately expressive logic. Considerable advances have already been made in this direc-
tion ([14]-[16], [18]-[29], [34]), and more results in the same style are probably still to come. It should be
however remembered that the main value of CoL, or anything else claiming to be a “Logic” with a capital
“L”, will eventually be determined by whether and how it relates to the outside, extra-logical world. In this
respect, unlike many other systems officially classified as “logics”, the merits of classical logic are obvious,
most eloquently demonstrated by the fact that applied formal theories, a model example of which is Peano
arithmetic PA, can be and have been successfully based on it. Unlike pure logics with their meaningless
symbols, such theories are direct tools for studying and navigating the real world with its non-man-made,
meaningful objects, such as natural numbers in the case of arithmetic. To make this point more clear to a
computer scientist, one could compare a pure logic with a programming language, and applied theories based
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on it with application programs written in that language. A programming language created for its own sake,
mathematically or esthetically appealing but otherwise unusable as a general-purpose, comprehensive basis
for application programs, would hardly be of much interest.
So, in parallel with studying possible axiomatizations and various metaproperties of pure CoL, it would
certainly be worthwhile to devote some efforts to justifying its right on existence through revealing its power
and appeal as a basis for applied systems. First and so far the only concrete steps in this direction have
been made very recently in [27], where a CoL-based system CLA1 of (Peano) arithmetic was constructed.1
Unlike its classical-logic-based counterpart PA, CLA1 is not merely about what arithmetical facts are true,
but about what arithmetical problems can be actually computed or effectively solved. More precisely, every
formula of the language of CLA1 expresses a number-theoretic computational problem (rather than just a
true/false fact), every theorem expresses a problem that has an algorithmic solution, and every proof encodes
such a solution. Does not this sound exactly like what the constructivists have been calling for?
Unlike the mathematical or philosophical constructivism, however, and even unlike the early-day the-
ory of computation, modern computer science has long understood that, what really matters, is not just
computability, but rather efficient computability. So, the next natural step on the road of revealing the impor-
tance of CoL for computer science would be showing that it can be used for studying efficient computability
just as successfully as for studying computability-in-principle. Anyone familiar with the earlier work on CoL
could have found reasons for optimistic expectations here. Namely, every provable formula of any of the
known sound axiomatizations of CoL happens to be a scheme of not only “always computable” problems, but
“always efficiently computable” problems just as well, whatever efficiency exactly means in the context of
interactive computation that CoL operates in. That is, at the level of pure logic, computability and efficient
computability yield the same classes of valid principles. The study of logic abounds with phenomena in this
style. One example would be the well known fact about classical logic, according to which validity with
respect to all possible models is equivalent to validity with respect to just models with countable domains.
At the level of reasonably expressive applied theories, however, one should certainly expect significant dif-
ferences depending on whether the underlying concept of interest is efficient computability or computability-
in-principle. For instance, the earlier-mentioned system CLA1 proves formulas expressing computable but
often intractable arithmetical problems. A purpose of the present paper is to construct a CoL-based system
for arithmetic which, unlike CLA1, proves only efficiently — specifically, polynomial time — computable
problems. The new applied formal theory CLA4 presented in Section 11 achieves this purpose. It is also
a good starting point for exploring the wider class of systems under the generic name “clarithmetic” —
arithmetical theories based on CoL, with CLA4 being a model example of complexity-oriented versions of
clarithmetic, a series of other variations of which, such as systems for polynomial space computability, prim-
itive recursive computability, PA-provably recursive computability and so on, are still to come in the near
future (see [30, 31]). Among the main purposes of the present piece of writing is to introduce the promising
world of clarithmetic to a relatively wide audience. This explains the semitutorial style in which the paper
is written. It targets readers with no prior familiarity with CoL.
Just like CLA1, our present system CLA4 is not only a cognitive, but also a problem-solving tool: in
order to find a solution for a given problem, it would be sufficient to write the problem in the language of
the system, and find a proof of it. An algorithmic solution for the problem then would automatically come
together with such a proof. However, unlike the solutions extracted from CLA1-proofs, which might be
intractable, the solutions extracted from CLA4-proofs would always be efficient.
Furthermore, CLA4 turns out to be not only sound, but also complete in a certain reasonable sense that
we call extensional completeness. According to the latter, every number-theoretic computational problem
that has a polynomial time solution is represented by some theorem of CLA4. Taking into account that
there are many ways to represent the same problem, extensional completeness is weaker than what can be
called intensional completeness, according to which any formula representing an (efficiently) computable
problem is provable. In these terms, Go¨del’s celebrated theorem, here with “truth”=“computability”, is
about intensional rather than extensional incompleteness. In fact, extensional completeness is not at all
interesting in the context of classical-logic-based theories such as PA. In such theories, unlike CoL-based
theories, it is trivially achieved, as the provable formula ⊤ represents every true sentence.
Syntactically, our CLA4 is an extension of PA, and the semantics of the former is a conservative
generalization of the semantics of the latter. Namely, the formulas of PA, which form only a proper subclass
1The paper [36] (in Chinese) is apparently another exception, focused on applications of CoL in AI.
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of the formulas of CLA4, are seen as special, “moveless” sorts of problems/games, automatically solved/won
when true and failed/lost when false. This makes the classical concept of truth just a special case of
computability in our sense — it is nothing but computability restricted to (the problems represented by) the
traditional sorts of formulas. And this means that Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems automatically extend
from PA to CLA4, so that, unlike extensional completeness, intensional completeness in CLA4 or any
other sufficiently expressive sound CoL-based applied theory is impossible to achieve in principle. As for
CLA1, it turns out to be incomplete in both senses. Section 15 shows that any recursively axiomatizable,
sufficiently expressive, sound system would be (not only intensionally but also) extensionally incomplete, as
long as the semantics of the system is based on unrestricted (as opposed to, say, efficient) computability.
Among the main moral merits of the present investigation and its contributions to the overall CoL project
is an illustration of the fact that, in constructing CoL-based applied theories, successfully switching from
computability to efficient computability is possible and even more than just possible. As noted, efficient
computability, in fact, turns out to be much better behaved than computability-in-principle: the former
allows us to achieve completeness in a sense in which the latter yields inherent incompleteness.
An advanced reader will easily understand that the present paper, while focused on the system CLA4 of
(cl)arithmetic, in fact is not only about arithmetic, but also just as much about CoL-based applied theories or
knowledge base systems in general, with CLA4 only serving as a model example of such systems. Generally,
the nonlogical axioms or the knowledge base of a CoL-based applied system would be any collection of
(formulas expressing) problems whose algorithmic or efficient solutions are known. Sometimes, together with
nonlogical axioms, we may also have nonlogical rules of inference, preserving the property of computability
or efficient computability. Then, the soundness of the corresponding underlying axiomatization of CoL (in
our present case, it is system CL12 studied in [27, 29]) — which usually comes in the strong form called
uniform-constructive soundness — guarantees that every theorem T of the theory also has an effective or
efficient solution and that, furthermore, such a solution can be effectively or efficiently extracted from a
proof of T . It is this fact that, as mentioned, makes CoL-based systems problem-solving tools.
More specifically, efficiency-oriented systems in the above style and CLA4 in particular can be seen
as programming languages, where “programming” simply means theorem-proving. The soundness of the
underlying system guarantees that any proof that can be written will be translatable into a program that
runs efficiently and indeed is a solution of the problem expressed by the target formula of the proof. Note that
the problem of verifying whether a program meets its specification, which is generally undecidable, is fully
neutralized here: the “specification” is nothing but the target formula of the proof, and the proof itself, while
encoding an efficient program, also automatically serves as a verification of the correctness of that program.
Furthermore, every step/formula of the proof can be viewed as its own (best possible) “comment”. In a more
ambitious and, at this point, somewhat fantastic perspective, after developing reasonable theorem-provers,
CoL-based efficiency-oriented systems can be seen as declarative programming languages in an extreme sense,
where human “programming” just means writing a formula expressing the problem whose efficient solution
is sought for systematic usage in the future. That is, a program simply coincides with its specification. The
compiler’s job would be finding a proof (the hard part) and translating it into a machine-language code (the
easy part). The process of compiling could thus take long but, once compiled, the program would run fast
ever after.
Various complexity-oriented systems have been studied in the literature ([2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 33, 35]
and more). A notable advantage of CoL-based complexity-oriented systems over the other systems with
similar aspirations, which typically happen to be inherently weak systems, is having actually or potentially
unlimited strength, with the latter including the full expressive and deductive power of classical logic and
Peano arithmetic. In view of the above-outlined potential applications, the importance of this feature is
obvious: the stronger a system, the better the chances that a proof/program will be found for a declarative,
non-preprocessed, ad hoc specification of the goal. Among the other appealing features of clarithmetic is
being semantically meaningful in the full generality of its language, scalable, and easy to understand in its
own right. Syntactically it also tends to be remarkably simple. For instance, on top of the standard Peano
axioms, our present system CLA4 only has two additional axioms ⊓x⊔y(y=x+1) and ⊓x⊔y(y=2x), one
saying that the function x+1 is (efficiently) computable, and the other saying the same about the function
2x. As will be seen later, from these two innocuous-looking axioms and one (also very simple) rule of
induction called CLA4-Induction, via CoL, one can obtain “practically full” information about polynomial
time computability of number-theoretic problems, in the same sense as PA, despite Go¨del’s incompleteness,
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allows us to obtain “practically full” information about arithmetical truth. To put it in other words, if a
formula F is not provable in CLA4, it is unlikely that anyone would find a polynomial time algorithm solving
the problem expressed by F : either such an algorithm does not exist, or (as will be seen from Theorem 16.2)
showing its correctness requires going beyond ordinary combinatorial reasoning formalizable in PA.
The closest ancestor of our present system CLA4 is Buss’s bounded arithmetic for polynomial time.
The similarity is related to the single yet important fact that the above-mentioned rule of CLA4-Induction
is nothing but an adaptation of Buss’s PIND (“Polynomial Induction”) principle to the new semantical
environment in which CLA4 operates. In this sense, CLA4 can be characterized as a “CoL-based bounded
arithmetic”, as opposed to Buss’s original versions of bounded arithmetic that are based on classical ([6]) or
intuitionistic ([7]) logics. The switch to CoL as the logical basis for such theories creates notable differences.
Among the advantages offered by this switch is absolute flexibility (as long as certain minimum-strength
requirements are satisfied) in selecting the underlying “purely arithmetical” axioms. Choosing the latter to
be the kind old axioms of Peano, as done in CLA4, allows us to achieve dramatically greater (than in the
case of Buss’s systems) intensional strength. Furthermore, as shown in Section 16, replacing Peano axioms
with stronger ones can take us arbitrarily close to intensional completeness. This is just as far as one can go
in similar pursuits because, as already noted, in view of Go¨del’s incompleteness phenomenon, no particular
recursively enumerable system can be intensionally complete. In contrast, even “slightly” increasing the
strength of the underlying (carefully hand-picked and intensionally very weak) set of arithmetical axioms in
classical-logic-based or intuitionistic-logic-based bounded arithmetic immediately results in loss of soundness.
We will come back to this topic in Section 17.
2 An informal overview of the main operations on games
Introducing and justifying CoL in full generality is not among the goals of the present paper — this job has
been done in [13, 17, 26]. We will reintroduce only as much of (the otherwise much wider) CoL as technically
necessary for understanding the system CLA4 based on it.
As noted, formulas in CoL represent computational problems. Such problems are understood as games
between two players: ⊤, called Machine, and ⊥, called Environment (these names will not always be
capitalized, and may take articles “a” or “the”). Machine is a mechanical device with fully determined,
algorithmic behavior. On the other hand, there are no restrictions on the behavior of Environment. A given
machine is considered to be solving a given problem iff it wins the corresponding game no matter how the
environment acts.
Standard atomic sentences, such as “0=0” or “Peggy is John’s mother”, are understood as special sorts
of games, called elementary. There are no moves in elementary games, and they are automatically won or
lost. Specifically, the elementary game represented by a true sentence is won (without making any moves)
by Machine, and the elementary game represented by a false sentence is won by Environment.
Logical operators are understood as operations on games/problems. One of the important groups of
such operations, termed choice operations, comprises ⊓ , ⊔ ,⊓,⊔. These are called choice conjunc-
tion, choice disjunction, choice universal quantifier and choice existential quantifier, respectively.
A0 ⊓A1 is a game where the first legal move (“choice”), which should be either 0 or 1, is by ⊥. After such
a move/choice i is made, the play continues and the winner is determined according to the rules of Ai; if a
choice is never made, ⊥ loses. A0 ⊔A1 is defined in a symmetric way with the roles of ⊥ and ⊤ interchanged:
here it is ⊤ who makes an initial choice and who loses if such a choice is not made. With the universe
of discourse being {0, 1, 10, 11, 100, . . .} (natural numbers identified with their binary representations), the
meanings of the quantifiers ⊓ and ⊔ can now be explained by
⊓xA(x) = A(0) ⊓A(1) ⊓A(10) ⊓A(11) ⊓A(100) ⊓ . . .
and
⊔xA(x) = A(0) ⊔A(1) ⊔A(10) ⊔A(11) ⊔A(100) ⊔ . . . .
So, for example,
⊓x
(
Prime(x) ⊔Composite(x)
)
is a game where the first move is by Environment. Such a move should consist in selecting a particular
number n for x, intuitively amounting to asking whether n is prime or composite. This move brings the
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game down to (in the sense that the game continues as)
Prime(n) ⊔Composite(n).
Now Machine has to move, or else it loses. The move should consist in choosing one of the two disjuncts.
Let us say the left disjunct is chosen, which further brings the game down to Prime(n). The latter is an
elementary game, and here the interaction ends. Machine wins iff it has chosen a true disjunct. The choice
of the left disjunct by Machine thus amounts to claiming/answering that n is prime. Overall, as we see,
⊓x
(
Prime(x) ⊔Composite(x)
)
represents the problem of deciding the primality question.2
Similarly,
⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y)
is the problem of computing the product of any two numbers. Here the first two moves are by Environment,
which selects some particular m = x and n = y, thus asking Machine to tell what the product of m and n
is. Machine wins if and only if, in response, it selects a (the) number k for z such that k=m×n.
Another group of game operations dealt with in this paper comprises ¬, ∧ , ∨ , → . Employing the classical
symbols for these operations is no accident, as they are conservative generalizations of the corresponding
Boolean operations from elementary games to all games.
Negation ¬ is a role-switch operation: it turns ⊤’s moves and wins into ⊥’s moves and wins, and vice
versa. Since elementary games have no moves, only the winners are switched there, so that, as noted, ¬
acts just as the ordinary classical negation when applied to such games. For instance, as ⊤ is the winner
in 0+1=1, the winner in ¬0+1=1 will be ⊥. That is, ⊤ wins the negation ¬A of an elementary game A iff
it loses A, i.e., if A is false. As for the meaning of negation when applied to nonelementary games, at this
point it may be useful to observe that ¬ interacts with choice operations in the kind old DeMorgan fashion.
For example, it would not be hard to see that
¬⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y) = ⊔x⊔y⊓z(z 6=x×y).
The operations ∧ and ∨ are called parallel conjunction and parallel disjunction, respectively.
Playing A0 ∧A1 (resp. A0 ∨A1) means playing the two games in parallel where, in order to win, ⊤ needs
to win in both (resp. at least one) of the components Ai. It is obvious that, just as in the case of negation,
∧ and ∨ act as classical conjunction and disjunction when applied to elementary games. For instance,
0+1=1 ∨ 0×1=1 is a game automatically won by Machine. There are no moves in it as there are no moves
in either disjunct, and Machine is an automatic winner because it is so in the left disjunct. To appreciate
the difference between the two — choice and parallel — groups of connectives, compare
⊓x
(
Prime(x) ⊔ ¬Prime(x)
)
and
⊓x
(
Prime(x) ∨ ¬Prime(x)
)
.
The former is a computationally nontrivial problem, existence of an easy (polynomial time) solution for
which had remained an open question until a few years ago. As for the latter, it is trivial, as Machine has
nothing to do in it: the first (and only) move is by Environment, consisting in choosing a number n for x.
Whatever n is chosen, Machine wins, as Prime(n) ∨ ¬Prime(n) is a true sentence and hence an automatically
⊤-won elementary game.
The operation → , called strict reduction, is defined by A→B = (¬A) ∨B. Intuitively, this is indeed
the problem of reducing B to A: solving A→B means solving B while having A as an external computational
resource. Resources are symmetric to problems: what is a problem to solve for one player is a resource that
the other player can use, and vice versa. Since A is negated in (¬A) ∨B and negation means switching the
roles, A appears as a resource rather than problem for ⊤ in A→B.
Consider ⊓x⊔y(y=x2). Anyone who knows the definition of x2 in terms of × (but perhaps does not
know the meaning of multiplication, or is unable to compute this function for whatever reason) would be
able to solve the problem
⊓z⊓u⊔v(v=z×u) → ⊓x⊔y(y=x2), (1)
2For simplicity, here we treat “Composite” as the complement of “Prime”, even though, strictly speaking, this is not quite
so: the numbers 0 and 1 are neither prime nor composite. Writing “Nonprime” instead of “Composite” would easily correct
this minor inaccuracy.
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i.e., the problem
⊔z⊔u⊓v(v 6=z×u) ∨ ⊓x⊔y(y=x2),
as it is about reducing the consequent to the antecedent. A solution here goes like this. Wait till Environment
specifies a value n for x, i.e. asks “what is the square of n?”. Do not try to immediately answer this question,
but rather specify the same value n for both z and u, thus asking the counterquestion: “what is n times
n?”. Environment will have to provide a correct answer m to this counterquestion (i.e., specify v as m where
m = n×n), or else it loses. Then, specify y as m, and rest your case. Note that, in this solution, Machine did
not have to compute multiplication, doing which had become Environment’s responsibility. Machine only
correctly reduced the problem of computing square to the problem of computing product, which made it the
winner.
Another group of operations that play an important role in CoL comprises ∀ and its dual ∃ (with
∃xA(x) = ¬∀x¬A(x)), called blind universal quantifier and blind existential quantifier, respectively.
∀xA(x) can be thought of as a “version” of ⊓xA(x) where the particular value of x that Environment selects
is invisible to Machine, so that it has to play blindly in a way that guarantees success no matter what that
value is.
Compare the problems ⊓x
(
Even(x) ⊔Odd(x)
)
and ∀x
(
Even(x) ⊔Odd(x)
)
. Both of them are about telling
whether a given number is even or odd; the difference is only in whether that “given number” is known to
Machine or not. The first problem is an easy-to-win, two-move-deep game of a structure that we have already
seen. The second game, on the other hand, is one-move deep with only Machine to make a move — select
the “true” disjunct, which is hardly possible to do as the value of x remains unspecified.
Just like all other operations for which we use classical symbols, the meanings of ∀ and ∃ are exactly
classical when applied to elementary games. Having this full collection of classical operations makes CoL a
generalization and conservative extension of classical logic.
Going back to an earlier example, even though (1) expresses a “very easily solvable” problem, that
formula is still not logically valid. Note that the success of the reduction strategy of the consequent to the
antecedent that we provided for it relies on the nonlogical fact that x2=x×x. That strategy would fail in a
general case where the meanings of x2 and x×x may not necessarily be the same. On the other hand, the
goal of CoL as a general-purpose problem-solving tool should be to allow us find purely logical solutions, i.e.,
solutions that do not require any special, domain-specific knowledge and (thus) would be good no matter
what the particular predicate or function symbols of the formulas mean. Any knowledge that might be
relevant should be explicitly stated and included either in the antecedent of a given formula or in the set
of axioms (“implicit antecedents” for every potential formula) of a CoL-based theory. In our present case,
formula (1) easily turns into a logically valid one by adding, to its antecedent, the definition of square in
terms of multiplication:
∀w(w2 =w×w) ∧⊓z⊓u⊔v(v=z×u) → ⊓x⊔y(y=x2). (2)
The strategy that we provided earlier for (1) is just as good for (2), with the difference that it is successful
for (2) no matter what x2 and z×u mean, whereas, in the case of (1), it was guaranteed to be successful only
under the standard arithmetical interpretations of the square and product functions. Thus, our strategy for
(2) is, in fact, a “purely logical” solution.
The above examples should not suggest that blind quantifiers are meaningful or useful only when applied
to elementary problems. The following is an example of a winnable nonelementary ∀-game:
∀y
(
Even(y) ⊔Odd(y) → ⊓x
(
Even(x+y) ⊔Odd(x+y)
))
. (3)
Solving this problem, which means reducing the consequent to the antecedent without knowing the value of
y, is easy: ⊤ waits till ⊥ selects a value n for x, and also tells — by selecting a ⊔ -disjunct in the antecedent
— whether y is even or odd. Then, if n and y are both even or both odd, ⊤ chooses the left ⊔ -disjunct in
the consequent, otherwise it chooses the right ⊔ -disjunct. Replacing the ∀y prefix by ⊓y would significantly
weaken the problem, obligating Environment to specify a value for y. Our strategy does not really need to
know the exact value of y, as it only exploits the information about y’s being even or odd, provided by the
antecedent of the formula.
Many more — natural, meaningful and useful — operations beyond the ones discussed in this section
have been introduced and studied within the framework of CoL. Here we have only surveyed those that are
relevant to our present investigation.
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3 Constant games
Now we are getting down to formal definitions of the concepts informally explained in the previous section.
To define games formally, we need certain technical terms and conventions. Let us agree that a move
means any finite string over the standard keyboard alphabet. A labeled move (labmove) is a move prefixed
with ⊤ or ⊥, with such a prefix (label) indicating which player has made the move. A run is a (finite or
infinite) sequence of labmoves, and a position is a finite run.
We will be exclusively using the letters Γ,∆,Φ for runs, and α, β for moves. The letter ℘ will always be
a variable for players, and
℘
will mean “℘’s adversary” (“the other player”). Runs will be often delimited by “〈” and “〉”, with 〈〉 thus
denoting the empty run. The meaning of an expression such as 〈Φ, ℘α,Γ〉 must be clear: this is the result
of appending to the position 〈Φ〉 the labmove 〈℘α〉 and then the run 〈Γ〉.
The following is a formal definition of what we call constant games, combined with some less formal
conventions regarding the usage of certain terminology.
Definition 3.1 A constant game is a pair A = (LrA,WnA), where:
1. LrA is a set of runs satisfying the condition that a (finite or infinite) run is in LrA iff all of its
nonempty finite initial segments are in LrA (notice that this implies 〈〉 ∈ LrA). The elements of LrA are
said to be legal runs of A, and all other runs are said to be illegal. We say that α is a legal move for
℘ in a position Φ of A iff 〈Φ, ℘α〉 ∈ LrA; otherwise α is illegal. When the last move of the shortest illegal
initial segment of Γ is ℘-labeled, we say that Γ is a ℘-illegal run of A.
2. WnA is a function that sends every run Γ to one of the players ⊤ or ⊥, satisfying the condition that
if Γ is a ℘-illegal run of A, then WnA〈Γ〉 = ℘. When WnA〈Γ〉 = ℘, we say that Γ is a ℘-won (or won by
℘) run of A; otherwise Γ is lost by ℘. Thus, an illegal run is always lost by the player who has made the
first illegal move in it.
An important operation not explicitly mentioned in Section 2 is what is called prefixation. This operation
takes two arguments: a constant game A and a position Φ that must be a legal position of A (otherwise
the operation is undefined), and returns the game 〈Φ〉A. Intuitively, 〈Φ〉A is the game playing which means
playing A starting (continuing) from position Φ. That is, 〈Φ〉A is the game to which A evolves (will be
“brought down”) after the moves of Φ have been made. We have already used this intuition when explaining
the meaning of choice operations in Section 2: we said that after ⊥ makes an initial move i ∈ {0, 1}, the
game A0 ⊓A1 continues as Ai. What this meant was nothing but that 〈⊥i〉(A0 ⊓A1) = Ai. Similarly,
〈⊤i〉(A0 ⊔A1) = Ai. Here is a definition of prefixation:
Definition 3.2 Let A be a constant game and Φ a legal position of A. The game 〈Φ〉A is defined by:
• Lr〈Φ〉A = {Γ | 〈Φ,Γ〉 ∈ LrA};
• Wn〈Φ〉A〈Γ〉 =WnA〈Φ,Γ〉.
A terminological convention important to remember is that we often identify a legal position Φ of a game
A with the game 〈Φ〉A. So, for instance, we may say that the move 1 by ⊥ brings the game B0 ⊓B1 down
to the position B1. Strictly speaking, B1 is not a position but a game, and what is a position is 〈⊥1〉, which
we here identified with the game B1 = 〈⊥1〉(B0 ⊓B1).
We say that a constant game A is finite-depth iff there is an integer d such that no legal run of A
contains more than d labmoves. The smallest of such integers d is called the depth of A. “Elementary”
means “of depth 0”.
This paper will exclusively deal with finite-depth games. This restriction of focus makes many definitions
and proofs simpler. Namely, in order to define a finite-depth-preserving game operation O(A1, . . . , An)
applied to such games, it suffices to specify the following:
(i) Who wins O(A1, . . . , An) if no moves are made, i.e., the value of Wn
O(A1,...,An)〈〉.
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(ii) What are the initial legal (lab)moves, i.e., the elements of {℘α | 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrO(A1,...,An)}, and to what
game is the game O(A1, . . . , An) brought down after such an initial legal labmove ℘α is made. Recall
that, by saying that a given labmove ℘α brings a given game A down to B, we mean that 〈℘α〉A = B.
Then, the set of legal runs of O(A1, . . . , An) will be uniquely defined, and so will be the winner in every legal
(and hence finite) run of the game.
Below we define a number of operations for finite-depth games only. Each of these operations can be
easily seen to preserve the finite-depth property. Of course, more general definitions of these operations —
not restricted to finite-depth games — do exist (see, e.g., [26]), but in this paper we are trying to keep things
as simple as possible.
Definition 3.3 Let A, B, A0, A1, . . . be finite-depth constant games, and n be a positive integer.
1. ¬A is defined by:
(i) Wn¬A〈〉 = ℘ iff WnA〈〉 = ℘.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr¬A iff 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA. Such an initial legal labmove ℘α brings the game down to
¬〈℘α〉A.
2. A0 ⊓ . . . ⊓An is defined by:
(i) WnA0 ⊓ ... ⊓ An〈〉 = ⊤.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA0 ⊓ ... ⊓ An iff ℘ = ⊥ and α = i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.3 Such an initial legal labmove ⊥i
brings the game down to Ai.
3. A0 ∧ . . . ∧An is defined by:
(i) WnA0 ∧ ... ∧ An〈〉 = ⊤ iff, for each i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, WnAi〈〉 = ⊤.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA0 ∧ ... ∧ An iff α = i.β, where i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and 〈℘β〉 ∈ LrAi . Such an initial
legal labmove ℘i.β brings the game down to
A0 ∧ . . . ∧Ai−1 ∧ 〈℘β〉Ai ∧Ai+1 ∧ . . . ∧An.
4. A0 ⊔ . . . ⊔An and A0 ∨ . . . ∨An are defined exactly as A0 ⊓ . . . ⊓An and A0 ∧ . . . ∧An, respectively,
only with “⊤” and “⊥” interchanged.
5. The infinite ⊓ -conjunction A0 ⊓A1 ⊓ . . . is defined exactly as A0 ⊓ . . . ⊓An, only with “i ∈ {0, 1, . . .}”
instead of “i ∈ {0, . . . , n}”. Similarly for the infinite version of ⊔ .
6. In addition to the earlier-established meanings, the symbols ⊤ and ⊥ also denote two special — simplest
— constant games, defined by Wn⊤〈〉 = ⊤, Wn⊥〈〉 = ⊥ and Lr⊤ = Lr⊥ = {〈〉}.
7. A→B is treated as an abbreviation of (¬A) ∨B.
Example 3.4 The game (0=0 ⊓ 0=1)→ (10=11 ⊓ 10=10), i.e. ¬(0=0 ⊓ 0=1) ∨ (10=11 ⊓ 10=10), has thir-
teen legal runs, which are:
1 〈〉. It is won by ⊤, because ⊤ is the winner in the right ∨ -disjunct (consequent).
2 〈⊤0.0〉. (The labmove of) this run brings the game down to ¬0=0 ∨ (10=11 ⊓ 10=10), and ⊤ is the winner
for the same reason as in the previous case.
3 〈⊤0.1〉. It brings the game down to ¬0=1 ∨ (10=11 ⊓ 10=10), and ⊤ is the winner because it wins in both
∨ -disjuncts.
4 〈⊥1.0〉. It brings the game down to ¬(0=0 ⊓ 0=1) ∨ 10=11. ⊤ loses as it loses in both ∨ -disjuncts.
3Here the number i is identified with the standard bit string representing it in the binary notation. The same applies to the
other clauses of this definition.
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5 〈⊥1.1〉. It brings the game down to ¬(0=0 ⊓ 0=1) ∨ 10=10. ⊤ wins as it wins in the right ∨ -disjunct.
6-7 〈⊤0.0,⊥1.0〉 and 〈⊥1.0,⊤0.0〉. Both bring the game down to the false ¬0=0 ∨ 10=11, and both are lost
by ⊤.
8-9 〈⊤0.1,⊥1.0〉 and 〈⊥1.0,⊤0.1〉. Both bring the game down to the true ¬0=1 ∨ 10=11, which makes ⊤
the winner.
10-11 〈⊤0.0,⊥1.1〉 and 〈⊥1.1,⊤0.0〉. Both bring the game down to the true ¬0=0 ∨ 10=10, so ⊤ wins.
12-13 〈⊤0.1,⊥1.1〉 and 〈⊥1.1,⊤0.1〉. Both bring the game down to the true ¬0=1 ∨ 10=10, so ⊤ wins.
4 Games as generalized predicates
Constant games can be seen as generalized propositions: while propositions in classical logic are just elements
of {⊤,⊥}, constant games are functions from runs to {⊤,⊥}. As we know, however, propositions only offer
very limited expressive power, and classical logic needs to consider the more general concept of predicates,
with propositions being nothing but special — constant — cases of predicates. The situation in CoL is
similar. Our concept of a (simply) game generalizes that of a constant game in the same sense as the
classical concept of a predicate generalizes that of a proposition.
We fix an infinite set of expressions called variables, for which we will be using x, y, z, s, r, t, u, v, w
as metavariables. An expression like ~x will usually stand for a finite sequence of variables. Similarly for
later-defined objects such as constants or terms.
We also fix another infinite set of expressions called constants:
{ǫ, 1, 10, 11, 100, 101, 110, 111, 1000, . . .}.
These are thus binary numerals— the strings matching the regular expression ǫ∪1(0∪1)∗, where ǫ is the
empty string. We will be typically identifying such strings — by some rather innocent abuse of concepts —
with the natural numbers represented by them in the standard binary notation, and vice versa. Note that
ǫ represents 0. For this reason, following the many-century tradition, we shall usually write 0 instead of ǫ,
keeping in mind that, in such contexts, the length |0| of the string 0 should be seen to be 0 rather than 1.
We will be mostly using a, b, c, d as metavariables for constants.
A universe (of discourse) is a pair (U,U ), where U is a nonempty set, and U , called the naming function
of the universe, is a function that sends each constant c to an element cU of U . The intuitive meaning of
cU = s is that c is a name of s. Both terminologically and notationally, we will typically identify each
universe (U,U ) with its first component and, instead of “(U,U )”, write simply “U”, keeping in mind that
each such “universe” U comes with a fixed associated function U . A universe U = (U,U ) is said to be ideal
iff U coincides with the above-fixed set of constants, and U is the identity function on that set. Note that,
in a non-ideal universe, such as the set of all real numbers, some objects may have several names (e.g.,
1/3, 2/6, 3/9 are different names of the same number), some have unique names (e.g. the famous number
π), and some have no names at all. The same applies to the universe of astronomy, where some stars and
planets have unique names, some have several names (Venus = Morning Star = Evening Star), and most
have no names at all. On the other hand, the standard universe of arithmetic is ideal: every natural number
has a unique name — the corresponding binary numeral — with which it can be identified.
By a valuation on a universe U , or a U -valuation, we mean a mapping e that sends each variable x to an
element e(x) of U . When a universe U is fixed, irrelevant or clear from the context, we may omit references
to it and simply say “valuation”. In these terms, a classical predicate p can be understood as a function that
sends each valuation e to a proposition, i.e., to a constant predicate. Similarly, what we call a game sends
valuations to constant games:
Definition 4.1 Let U be a universe. A game on U is a function A from U -valuations to constant games.
We write e[A] (rather than A(e)) to denote the constant game returned by A on valuation e. Such a constant
game e[A] is said to be an instance of A. For readability, we usually write LrAe and Wn
A
e instead of Lr
e[A]
and Wne[A].
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Just as this is the case with propositions versus predicates, constant games in the sense of Definition
3.1 will be thought of as special, constant cases of games in the sense of Definition 4.1. In particular, each
constant game A′ is the game A such that, for every valuation e, e[A] = A′. From now on we will no longer
distinguish between such A and A′, so that, if A is a constant game, it is its own instance, with A = e[A]
for every e.
Where n is a natural number, we say that a game A is n-ary iff there are n variables such that, for any
two valuations e1 and e2 that agree on all those variables, we have e1[A] = e2[A]. Generally, a game that is
n-ary for some n, is said to be finitary. Our paper is going to exclusively deal with finitary games and, for
this reason, we agree that, from now on, when we say “game”, we usually mean “finitary game”.
For a variable x and valuations e1, e2, we write e1 ≡x e2 to mean that the two valuations have the same
universe and agree on all variables other than x.
We say that a game A depends on a variable x iff there are two valuations e1, e2 with e1 ≡x e2 such
that e1[A] 6= e2[A]. An n-ary game thus depends on at most n variables. And constant games are nothing
but 0-ary games, i.e., games that do not depend on any variables.
We say that a (not necessarily constant) game A is elementary iff so are all of its instances e[A]. And
we say that A is finite-depth iff there is a (smallest) integer d, called the depth of A, such that the depth
of no instance of A exceeds d.
Just as constant games are generalized propositions, games can be treated as generalized predicates.
Namely, we will see each predicate p of whatever arity as the same-arity elementary game such that, for
every valuation e, Wnpe〈〉 = ⊤ iff p is true at e. And vice versa: every elementary game p will be seen
as the same-arity predicate which is true at a given valuation e iff Wnpe〈〉 = ⊤. Thus, for us, “predicate”
and “elementary game” are going to be synonyms. Accordingly, any standard terminological or notational
conventions familiar from the literature for predicates also apply to them seen as elementary games.
Just as the Boolean operations straightforwardly extend from propositions to all predicates, our opera-
tions ¬, ∧ , ∨ , → , ⊓ , ⊔ extend from constant games to all games. This is done by simply stipulating that
e[. . .] commutes with all of those operations: ¬A is the game such that, for every valuation e, e[¬A] = ¬e[A];
A ⊓B is the game such that, for every valuation e, e[A ⊓B] = e[A] ⊓ e[B]; etc. So does the operation of
prefixation: provided that Φ is a legal position of every instance of A, 〈Φ〉A is understood as the unique
game such that, for every valuation e, e[〈Φ〉A] = 〈Φ〉e[A].
Definition 4.2 Let A be a finite-depth game on a universe U , x1, . . . , xn be pairwise distinct variables, and
c1, . . . , cn be constants. On the same universe, the game which we call the result of substituting x1, . . . , xn
by c1, . . . , cn in A, denoted A(x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn), is defined by stipulating that, for every valuation e on U ,
e[A(x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn)] = e
′[A], where e′ is the valuation on U that sends each xi to ci and agrees with e on
all other variables.
Following the standard readability-improving practice established in the literature for predicates, we will
often fix pairwise distinct variables x1, . . . , xn for a game A and write A as A(x1, . . . , xn). Representing A in
this form sets a context in which we can write A(c1, . . . , cn) to mean the same as the more clumsy expression
A(x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn).
Definition 4.3 Let A(x) be a finite-depth game on a given universe. On the same universe, ⊓xA(x) and
⊔xA(x) are defined as the following two games, respectively:
A(0) ⊓A(1) ⊓A(10) ⊓A(11) ⊓A(100) ⊓ . . . ;
A(0) ⊔A(1) ⊔A(10) ⊔A(11) ⊔A(100) ⊔ . . . .
Thus, every initial legal move of ⊓xA(x) or ⊔xA(x) is a constant c ∈ {0, 1, 10, 11, 100, . . .}, which in our
informal language we may refer to as “the constant chosen (by the corresponding player) for x”.
We will say that a game A is unistructural iff, for any two valuations e1 and e2, Lr
A
e1
= LrAe2 . Of
course, all constant or elementary games are unistructural. It can also be easily seen that all our game
operations preserve the unistructural property of games. For the purposes of the present paper, considering
only unistructural games would be sufficient.
We define the remaining operations ∀ and ∃ only for unistructural games:
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Definition 4.4 Below A(x) is an arbitrary finite-depth unistructural game on a universe U . On the same
universe:
1. The game ∀xA(x) is defined by stipulating that, for every U -valuation e, player ℘ and move α, we have:
(i) Wn∀xA(x)e 〈〉 = ⊤ iff, for every valuation g with g ≡x e, Wn
A(x)
g 〈〉 = ⊤.
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr∀xA(x)e iff 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr
A(x)
e . Such an initial legal labmove ℘α brings the game
e[∀xA(x)] down to e[∀x〈℘α〉A(x)].
2. The game ∃xA(x) is defined in exactly the same way, only with ⊤ and ⊥ interchanged.
Example 4.5 Consider the game (3) on the ideal universe, discussed earlier in Section 2. The sequence
〈⊥1.11, ⊥0.0, ⊤1.1〉 is a legal run of (3), the effects of the moves of which are shown below:
(3) : ∀y
(
Even(y) ⊔Odd(y)→⊓x
(
Even(x+y) ⊔Odd(x+y)
))
〈⊥1.11〉(3) : ∀y
(
Even(y) ⊔Odd(y)→ Even(11+y) ⊔Odd(11+y)
)
〈⊥1.11,⊥0.0〉(3) : ∀y
(
Even(y)→Even(11+y) ⊔Odd(11+y)
)
〈⊥1.11,⊥0.0,⊤1.1〉(3) : ∀y
(
Even(y)→Odd(11+y)
)
The play hits (ends as) the true proposition ∀y
(
Even(y)→Odd(11+y)
)
and hence is won by ⊤.
Before closing this section, we want to make the rather straightforward observation that the DeMorgan
dualities hold for all of our sorts of conjunctions, disjunctions and quantifiers, and so does the double negation
principle. That is, we always have:
¬¬A = A;
¬(A ∧B) = ¬A ∨ ¬B; ¬(A ∨B) = ¬A ∧ ¬B;
¬(A ⊓B) = ¬A ⊔ ¬B; ¬(A ⊔B) = ¬A ⊓ ¬B;
¬∀xA(x) = ∃x¬A(x); ¬∃xA(x) = ∀x¬A(x);
¬⊓xA(x) = ⊔x¬A(x); ¬⊔xA(x) = ⊓x¬A(x).
5 Algorithmic strategies through interactive machines
In traditional game-semantical approaches, including Blass’s [4, 5] approach which is the closest precursor
of ours, player’s strategies are understood as functions — typically as functions from interaction histories
(positions) to moves, or sometimes ([1]) as functions that only look at the latest move of the history. This
strategies-as-functions approach, however, is inapplicable in the context of CoL, whose relaxed semantics,
in striving to get rid of “bureaucratic pollutants” and only deal with the remaining true essence of games,
does not impose any regulations on which player can or should move in a given situation. Here, in many
cases, either player may have (legal) moves, and then it is unclear whether the next move should be the
one prescribed by ⊤’s strategy function or the one prescribed by the strategy function of ⊥. For a game
semantics whose ambition is to provide a comprehensive, natural and direct tool for modeling interaction,
the strategies-as-functions approach would be less than adequate, even if technically possible. This is so for
the simple reason that the strategies that real computers follow are not functions. If the strategy of your
personal computer was a function from the history of interaction with you, then its performance would keep
noticeably worsening due to the need to read the continuously lengthening — and, in fact, practically infinite
— interaction history every time before responding. Fully ignoring that history and looking only at your
latest keystroke in the spirit of [1] is also not what your computer does, either.
In CoL, (⊤’s effective) strategies are defined in terms of interactive machines, where computation is one
continuous process interspersed with — and influenced by — multiple “input” (environment’s moves) and
“output” (machine’s moves) events. Of several, seemingly rather different yet equivalent, machine models of
interactive computation studied in CoL, here we will employ the most basic, HPM (“Hard-Play Machine”)
model.
An HPM is nothing but a Turing machine with the additional capability of making moves. The adversary
can also move at any time, with such moves being the only nondeterministic events from the machine’s
11
perspective. Along with the ordinary work tape, the machine has an additional tape called the run tape.
The latter, serving as a dynamic input, at any time spells the “current position” of the play. Its role is to
make the run fully visible to the machine.
In these terms, an algorithmic solution (⊤’s winning strategy) for a given constant game A is understood
as an HPMM such that, no matter how the environment acts during its interaction withM (what moves it
makes and when), the run incrementally spelled on the run tape is a ⊤-won run of A. As for ⊥’s strategies,
there is no need to define them: all possible behaviors by ⊥ are accounted for by the different possible
nondeterministic updates of the run tape of an HPM.
In the above outline, we described HPMs in a relaxed fashion, without being specific about technical
details such as, say, how, exactly, moves are made by the machine, how many moves either player can make
at once, what happens if both players attempt to move “simultaneously”, etc. As it turns out, all reasonable
design choices yield the same class of winnable games as long as we consider a certain natural subclass of
games called static. Such games are obtained by imposing a certain simple formal condition on games (see,
e.g., Section 5 of [26]), which we do not reproduce here as nothing in this paper relies on it. We shall only
point out that, intuitively, static games are interactive tasks where the relative speeds of the players are
irrelevant, as it never hurts a player to postpone making moves. In other words, static games are games
that are contests of intellect rather than contests of speed. And one of the theses that CoL philosophically
relies on is that static games present an adequate formal counterpart of our intuitive concept of “pure”,
speed-independent interactive computational problems. Correspondingly, CoL restricts its attention (more
specifically, possible interpretations of the atoms of its formal language) to static games. All elementary
games turn out to be trivially static, and the class of static games turns out to be closed under all game
operations studied in CoL. More specifically, all games expressible in the language of the later-defined logic
CL12, or theory CLA4, are static, as well as constant, finitary and finite-depth. Accordingly, we agree
that, in this paper, we shall use the term “computational problem”, or simply “problem”, as a synonym
of “constant, finitary, finite-depth, static game”.
6 The HPM model in greater detail
As noted, computability of static games is rather robust with respect to the technical details of the underlying
model of interaction. And the loose description of HPMs that we gave in the previous section would be
sufficient for most purposes, just as mankind had been rather comfortably studying and using algorithms
long before the Church-Turing thesis in its precise form came around. Namely, relying on just the intuitive
concept of algorithmic strategies (believed in CoL to be adequately captured by the HPM model) would be
sufficient if we only needed to show existence of such strategies for various games. As it happens, however,
later sections of this paper need to arithmetize such strategies in order to prove the promised extensional
completeness of CLA4. The complexity-theoretic concepts defined in the next section also require certain
more specific details about HPMs, and in this section we provide such details. It should be pointed out again
that most — if not all — of such details are “negotiable”, as different reasonable arrangements would yield
equivalent models.
Just like an ordinary Turing machine, an HPM has a finite set of states, one of which has the special
status of being the start state. There are no accept, reject, or halt states, but there are specially designated
states calledmove states. It is assumed that the start state is not among the move states. As noted earlier,
this is a two-tape machine, with a read-writework tape and read-only run tape. Each tape has a beginning
but no end, and is divided into infinitely many cells, arranged in the left-to-right order: cell #0, cell #1,
cell #2, etc. At any time, each cell will contain one symbol from a certain fixed finite set of tape symbols.
The blank symbol, as well as ⊤ and ⊥, are among the tape symbols. We also assume that these three
symbols are not among the symbols that any (legal or illegal) move can ever contain. Either tape has its
own scanning head, at any given time looking (located) at one of the cells of the tape. A transition from
one computation step (“clock cycle”) to another happens according to the fixed transition function
of the machine. The latter, depending on the current state, and the symbols seen by the two heads on the
corresponding tapes, deterministically prescribes the next state, the tape symbol by which the old symbol
should be overwritten in the current cell (the cell currently scanned by the head) of the work tape, and, for
each head, the direction — one cell left or one cell right — in which the head should move. A constraint
here is that the blank symbol, ⊤ or ⊥ can never be written by the machine on the work tape. An attempt
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to move left when the head of a given tape is looking at the leftmost cell results in staying put. So does an
attempt to move right when the head is looking at the blank symbol.
When the machine starts working, it is in its start state, both scanning heads are looking at the leftmost
cells of the corresponding tapes, and (all cells of) both tapes are blank (i.e., contain the blank symbol).
Whenever the machine enters a move state, the string α spelled by (the contents of) its work tape cells,
starting from cell #0 and ending with the cell immediately left to the work-tape scanning head, will be
automatically appended — at the beginning of the next clock cycle — to the contents of the run tape in
the ⊤-prefixed form ⊤α. And, on every transition, whether the machine is in a move state or not, any finite
sequence ⊥β1, . . . ,⊥βm of ⊥-labeled moves may be nondeterministically appended to the contents of the
run tape. If the above two events happen on the same clock cycle, then the moves will be appended to the
contents of the run tape in the following order: ⊤α⊥β1 . . .⊥βm (note the technicality that labmoves are
listed on the run tape without blanks or commas between them).
With each labmove that emerges on the run tape, we associate its timestamp, which is the number of
the clock cycle immediately preceding the cycle on which the move first emerged on the run tape. Intuitively,
the timestamp indicates on which cycle the move was made rather than appeared on the run tape: a move
made during cycle #i appears on the run tape on cycle #i+1 rather than #i. Also, we agree that the count
of clock cycles, just like the count of cells, starts from 0, meaning that the very first clock cycle is cycle #0
rather than #1.
A configuration of a given HPM M is a full description of the contents of the two tapes, the locations
of the two scanning heads, and the state of the machine at the beginning of some (“current”) clock cycle. A
computation branch of M is an infinite sequence C0, C1, C2, . . . of configurations of M, where C0 is the
initial configuration (as explained earlier), and every Ci+1 is a configuration that could have legally followed
(again, in the sense explained earlier) Ci. For a computation branch B, the run spelled by B is the run Γ
incrementally spelled on the run tape in the corresponding scenario of interaction. We say that such a Γ is
a run generated by the machine.
We say that a given HPM M wins (computes, solves) a given constant game A — and write M |= A
— iff every run Γ generated by M is a ⊤-won run of A. We say that A is computable iff there is an HPM
M such that M |= A; such an HPM is said to be an (algorithmic) solution, or winning strategy, for A.
7 Interactive complexity
The size of a move α means the length of α as a string. In the context of a given computation branch of a
given HPM M, by the background of a clock cycle c we mean the greatest of the sizes of Environment’s
moves made by (before) time c, or 0 if there are no such moves. If M makes a move on cycle c, then the
background of that move4 means the background of c. Next, whenever M makes a move on cycle c, by the
timecost of that move we mean c−d, where d is the greatest cycle with d<c on which a move was made by
either player, or is 0 if there is no such cycle.
Throughout this paper, an n-ary arithmetical function means a function from n-tuples of natural
numbers to natural numbers. As always, “unary” means “1-ary”.
Definition 7.1 Let h be a unary arithmetical function, and M an HPM.
1. We say that M runs in time h, or that M is an h time machine, or that h is a bound for the
time complexity of M, iff, in every play (computation branch), for any clock cycle c on which M makes a
move, neither the timecost nor the size of that move exceeds h(ℓ), where ℓ is the background of c.
2. We say that M runs in space h, or that M is an h space machine, or that h is a bound for the
space complexity of M, iff, in every play (computation branch), for any clock cycle c, the number of cells
ever visited by the work-tape head of M by time c does not exceed h(ℓ), where ℓ is the background of c.
Our time complexity concept can be seen to be in the spirit of what is usually called response time.
The latter generally does not and should not depend on the length of the preceding interaction history.
On the other hand, it is not and should not be merely a function of the adversary’s last move, either. A
similar characterization applies to our concept of space complexity. Both complexity measures are equally
4As easily understood, here and in similar contexts, “move” means a move not as a string, but as an event, namely, the
event of M making a move at time c.
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meaningful whether it be in the context of “short-lasting” games (such as the ones represented by the formulas
of the later-defined logic CL12) or the context of games that may have “very long” and even infinitely long
legal runs.
Let A be a constant game, h a unary arithmetical function, and M an HPM. We say that M wins
(computes, solves) A in time h, or that M is an h time solution for A, iff M is an h time machine
with M |= A. We say that A is computable (winnable, solvable) in time h iff it has an h time solution.
Similarly for “space” instead of “time”.
When we say polynomial time, it is to be understood as “time h for some polynomial function h”.
Similarly for polynomial space.
Many concepts introduced within the framework of CoL are generalizations — for the interactive context
— of ordinary and well-studied concepts of the traditional theory of computation. The above-defined time
and space complexities are among such concepts. Let us focus on polynomial time for the rest of this section,
and look at the traditional notion of polynomial time computability of a function f(x) for instance. With
a moment’s thought, it can be seen to be equivalent to polynomial time computability (in our sense) of
the problem ⊓x⊔y
(
y = f(x)
)
. Similarly, polynomial time decidability of a predicate p(x) means the same
as polynomial time computability of the problem ⊓x
(
¬p(x) ⊔ p(x)
)
. Further, what is traditionally called
(mapping) polynomial time reducibility of a predicate p(x) to a predicate q(x) can be seen to mean nothing
but polynomial time computability of the problem ⊓x⊔y
(
p(x)↔ q(y)
)
, where E ↔ F is an abbreviation of
(E→ F ) ∧ (F →E). If we want to say that a particular function f(x) is a polynomial time reduction of p(x)
to q(x), then we can write ⊓x⊔y
(
y = f(x)
)
∧ ∀x
(
p
(
x
)
↔ q
(
f(x)
))
. And so on.
Our formalism can be used for systematically defining and studying an infinite variety of meaningful
complexity-theoretic properties, relations and operations, only some of which (as the above ones) may have
established names in the literature. Consider, for instance, the problem
⊓x
(
¬q(x) ⊔ q(x)
)
→⊓x
(
¬p(x) ⊔ p(x)
)
. (4)
It expresses (its polynomial time computability means, that is) a sort of polynomial time reducibility of
p(x) to q(x). This reducibility can be seen to be strictly weaker than the traditional sort of polynomial
time reducibility captured by the earlier mentioned ⊓x⊔y
(
y = f(x)
)
. For instance, every predicate p(x) is
reducible to its complement ¬p(x) in the sense of (4). Namely, a polynomial time strategy for
⊓x
(
p(x) ⊔ ¬p(x)
)
→⊓x
(
¬p(x) ⊔ p(x)
)
goes as follows. Wait till a value n for x is specified in the consequent. Then specify the same value for x
in the antecedent. Further wait till a ⊔ -disjunct is selected in the antecedent. If the first (resp. second)
disjunct is selected there, select the second (resp. first) ⊔ -disjunct in the consequent, and celebrate victory.
On the other hand, we cannot say that every predicate p(x) is also polynomial time reducible — in the
sense of ⊓x⊔y
(
y = f(x)
)
— to its complement. Take p(x) to be any coNP-complete predicate. If it was
polynomial time reducible to its complement, then we would have NP=coNP.
8 The language of logic CL12 and its semantics
Logic CL12 will be axiomatically constructed in Section 9. The present section is merely devoted to its
language. The building blocks of the formulas of the latter are:
• Nonlogical predicate letters, for which we use p, q as metavariables. With each predicate letter is
associated a fixed nonnegative integer called its arity. We assume that, for any n, there are infinitely
many n-ary predicate letters.
• Function letters, for which we use f, g as metavariables. Again, each function letter comes with a
fixed arity, and we assume that, for any n, there are infinitely many n-ary function letters.
• The binary logical predicate letter = .
• Infinitely many variables and constants. These are the same as the ones fixed in Section 4.
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Terms, for which we use τ, ψ, ξ, χ, θ, η as metavariables, are built from variables, constants and function
letters in the standard way. An atomic formula is p(τ1, . . . , τn), where p is an n-ary predicate letter and
the τi are terms. When p is 0-ary, we write p instead of p(). Also, we write τ1=τ2 instead of =(τ1, τ2),
and τ1 6=τ2 instead of ¬(τ1=τ2). Formulas are built from atomic formulas, propositional connectives ⊤,⊥
(0-ary), ¬ (1-ary), ∧ , ∨ , ⊓ , ⊔ (2-ary), variables and quantifiers ∀, ∃,⊓,⊔ in the standard way, with the
exception that, officially, ¬ is only allowed to be applied to atomic formulas. The definitions of free and
bound occurrences of variables are also standard (with ⊓,⊔ acting as quantifiers along with ∀, ∃). A formula
with no free occurrences of variables is said to be closed.
Note that, terminologically, ⊤ and ⊥ do not count as atoms. For us, atoms are formulas containing no
logical operators. The formulas ⊤ and ⊥ do not qualify because they are (0-ary) logical operators themselves.
¬E, where E is not atomic, will be understood as a standard abbreviation: ¬⊤ = ⊥, ¬¬E = E,
¬(A ∧B) = ¬A ∨ ¬B, ¬⊓xE = ⊔x¬E, etc. And E→ F will be understood as an abbreviation of ¬E ∨ F .
Parentheses will often be omitted — as we just did — if there is no danger of ambiguity. When omitting
parentheses, we assume that ¬ and the quantifiers have the highest precedence, and → has the lowest prece-
dence. An expression E1 ∧ . . . ∧En, where n ≥ 2, is to be understood as E1 ∧ (E2 ∧ (. . . ∧ (En−1 ∧En) . . .)).
Sometimes we can write this expression for an unspecified n ≥ 0 (rather than n ≥ 2). Such a formula, in the
case of n = 1, should be understood as simply E1. Similarly for ∨ , ⊓ , ⊔ . As for the case of n = 0, ∧ and
⊓ should be understood as ⊤ while ∨ and ⊔ as ⊥.
Sometimes a formula F will be represented as F (s1, . . . , sn), where the si are variables. When doing so,
we do not necessarily mean that each si has a free occurrence in F , or that every variable occurring free in
F is among s1, . . . , sn. However, it will always be assumed (usually only implicitly) that the si are pairwise
distinct, and have no bound occurrences in F . In the context set by the above representation, F (τ1, . . . , τn)
will mean the result of replacing, in F , each occurrence of each si by term τi. When writing F (τ1, . . . , τn),
it will always be assumed (again, usually only implicitly) that the terms τ1, . . . , τn contain no variables that
have bound occurrences in F , so that there are no unpleasant collisions of variables when doing replacements.
Similar — well established in the literature — notational conventions apply to terms.
A sequent is an expression E1, . . . , En ◦– F , where E1, . . . , En (n ≥ 0) and F are formulas. Here
E1, . . . , En is said to be the antecedent of the sequent, and F said to be the succedent.
By a free (resp. bound) variable of a sequent we shall mean a variable that has a free (resp. bound)
occurrence in one of the formulas of the sequent. For safety and simplicity, throughout the rest of this paper
we assume that the sets of all free and bound variables of any formula or sequent that we ever consider —
unless strictly implied otherwise by the context — are disjoint. This restriction, of course, does not yield
any loss of expressive power, as variables can always be renamed so as to satisfy this condition.
An interpretation is a pair (U,∗ ), where U = (U,U ) is a universe and ∗ is a function that sends:
• every n-ary function letter f to a function f∗ : Un → U ;
• every nonlogical n-ary predicate letter p to an n-ary predicate (elementary game) p∗(s1, . . . , sn) on U
which does not depend on any variables other than s1, . . . , sn.
The above uniquely extends to a mapping that sends each term τ to a function τ∗, and each formula F
to a game F ∗, by stipulating that:
1. c∗ = cU (any constant c).
2. s∗ = s (any variable s).
3. Where f is an n-ary function letter and τ1, . . . , τn are terms,
(
f(τ1, . . . , τn)
)∗
= f∗(τ∗1 , . . . , τ
∗
n).
4. Where τ1 and τ2 are terms, (τ1=τ2)
∗ is τ∗1 =τ
∗
2 .
5. Where p is an n-ary nonlogical predicate letter and τ1, . . . , τn are terms,
(
p(τ1, . . . , τn)
)∗
= p∗(τ∗1 , . . . , τ
∗
n).
6. ∗ commutes with all logical operators, seeing them as the corresponding game operations: ⊥∗ = ⊥,
(E1 ∧ . . . ∧En)
∗ = E∗1 ∧ . . . ∧E
∗
n, (⊓xE)∗ = ⊓x(E∗), etc.
While an interpretation is a pair (U,∗ ), terminologically and notationally we will usually identify it with
its second component and write ∗ instead of (U,∗ ), keeping in mind that every such “interpretation” ∗ comes
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with a fixed universe U , said to be the universe of ∗. When O is a function letter, a predicate letter, a
constant or a formula, and O∗ = W , we say that ∗ interprets O as W . We can also refer to such a W as
“O under interpretation ∗”.
When a given formula is represented as F (x1, . . . , xn), we will typically write F
∗(x1, . . . , xn) instead of(
F (x1, . . . , xn)
)∗
. A similar practice will be used for terms as well.
We agree that, for a formula F , an interpretation ∗ and an HPM M, whenever we say that M is a
solution of F ∗ or write M |= F ∗, we mean that M is a solution of the (constant) game ⊓x1 . . .⊓xn(F ∗),
where x1, . . . , xn are exactly the free variables of F , listed according to their lexicographic order. We call
the above game the ⊓-closure of F ∗, and denote it by ⊓F ∗. The ∀-closure ∀F ∗ is defined similarly. The
same notational convention extends from games to formulas.
Note that, for any given formula F , the Lr component of the game ⊓F ∗ does not depend on the
interpretation ∗. Hence we can safely say “legal run of ⊓F” without indicating an interpretation applied to
the formula.
9 The axiomatization of logic CL12
Our formulations rely on some terminology and notation, explained below.
A formula not containing any choice operators ⊓ , ⊔ ,⊓,⊔ — i.e., a formula of the language of classical
first order logic — is said to be elementary. A sequent is elementary iff all of its formulas are so.
The elementarization
‖F‖
of a formula F is the result of replacing in F all ⊔ - and ⊔-subformulas by ⊥, and all ⊓ - and ⊓-subformulas
by ⊤. Note that ‖F‖ is (indeed) an elementary formula. The elementarization ‖G1, . . . , Gn ◦–F‖ of a
sequent G1, . . . , Gn ◦– F is the elementary formula ‖G1‖ ∧ . . . ∧ ‖Gn‖→ ‖F‖.
A sequent is said to be stable iff its elementarization is classically valid. By “classical validity”, in view
of Go¨del’s completeness theorem, we mean provability in some standard classical first-order calculus with
constants, function letters and = , where = is treated as the logical identity predicate (so that, say, x=x,
x=y→ (E(x)→E(y)), etc. are provable).
A surface occurrence of a subformula is an occurrence that is not in the scope of any choice operators.
We will be using the notation
F [E]
to mean a formula F together with some (single) fixed surface occurrence of a subformula E. Using this
notation sets a context, in which F [H ] will mean the result of replacing in F [E] the (fixed) occurrence of E
by H . Note that here we are talking about some occurrence of E. Only that occurrence gets replaced when
moving from F [E] to F [H ], even if the formula also had some other occurrences of E.
By a rule (of inference) in this section we mean a binary relation YRX , where Y = 〈Y1, . . . , Yn〉 is a
finite sequence of sequents and X is a sequent. Instances of such a relation are schematically written as
Y1, . . . , Yn
X
,
where Y1, . . . , Yn are called the premises, and X is called the conclusion. Whenever YRX holds, we say
that X follows from Y by R.
Expressions such as ~G, ~K, . . . will usually stand for finite sequences of formulas. The standard meaning
of an expression such as ~G, F, ~K should also be clear.
THE RULES OF CL12
CL12 has the six rules listed below, with the following additional conditions/explanations:
1. In ⊔ -Choose and ⊓ -Choose, i ∈ {0, 1}.
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2. In ⊔-Choose and ⊓-Choose, t is either a constant or a variable with no bound occurrences in the
premise, and H(t) is the result of replacing by t all free occurrences of x in H(x) (rather than vice
versa).
⊔ -Choose
~G ◦– F [Hi]
~G ◦– F [H0 ⊔H1]
⊓ -Choose
~G, E[Hi], ~K ◦– F
~G, E[H0 ⊓H1], ~K ◦– F
⊓-Choose
~G, E[H(t)], ~K ◦– F
~G, E[⊓xH(x)], ~K ◦– F
⊔-Choose
~G ◦– F [H(t)]
~G ◦– F [⊔xH(x)]
Replicate
~G,E, ~K ◦– F
~G,E, ~K,E ◦–F
Wait
Y1, . . . , Yn
(n ≥ 0), where all of the following five conditions are satisfied:
X
1. ⊓ -Condition: Whenever X has the form ~G ◦–F [H0 ⊓H1], both of the sequents ~G ◦– F [H0] and
~G ◦– F [H1] are among Y1, . . . , Yn.
2. ⊔ -Condition: WheneverX has the form ~G,E[H0 ⊔H1], ~K ◦–F , both of the sequents ~G,E[H0], ~K ◦– F
and ~G,E[H1], ~K ◦–F are among Y1, . . . , Yn.
3. ⊓-Condition: Whenever X has the form ~G ◦–F [⊓xH(x)], for some variable y not occurring in X ,
the sequent ~G ◦–F [H(y)] is among Y1, . . . , Yn. Here and below, H(y) is the result of replacing by y
all free occurrences of x in H(x) (rather than vice versa).
4. ⊔-Condition: Whenever X has the form ~G,E[⊔xH(x)], ~K ◦– F , for some variable y not occurring
in X , the sequent ~G,E[H(y)], ~K ◦–F is among Y1, . . . , Yn.
5. Stability Condition: X is stable.
A CL12-proof of a sequent X is a sequence X1, . . . , Xn of sequents, with Xn = X , such that, each Xi
follows by one of the rules of CL12 from some (possibly empty in the case of Wait, and certainly empty in
the case of i = 1) set P of premises such that P ⊆ {X1, . . . , Xi−1}. When a CL12-proof of X exists, we say
that X is provable in CL12, and write CL12 ⊢ X .
A CL12-proof of a formula F will be understood as a CL12-proof of the empty-antecedent sequent
◦–F . Accordingly, CL12 ⊢ F means CL12 ⊢ ◦–F .
CL12 is a conservative extension of classical logic (see [27]). Namely, an elementary sequentE1, . . . , En ◦–F
is provable in CL12 iff the formula E1 ∧ . . . ∧En→ F is valid in the classical sense. It is also a conservative
extension of the earlier known logic CL3 studied in [18].5 The latter is nothing but the empty-antecedent
fragment of CL12 without function letters and identity.
5An essentially the same logic, under the name L, was in fact known as early as in [12].
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Example 9.1 In this example, × is a binary function letter and 3 is a unary function letter. We write x×y
and x3 instead of ×(x, y) and 3(x), respectively. The following sequence of sequents is a CL12-proof (of its
last sequent):
1. ∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
, t=s×s, r=t×s ◦– r=s3 Wait: (no premises)
2. ∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
, t=s×s, r=t×s ◦– ⊔y(y=s3) ⊔-Choose: 1
3. ∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
, t=s×s, ⊔z(z=t×s) ◦– ⊔y(y=s3) Wait: 2
4. ∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
, t=s×s, ⊓y⊔z(z=t×y) ◦– ⊔y(y=s3) ⊓-Choose: 3
5. ∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
, t=s×s, ⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y) ◦– ⊔y(y=s3) ⊓-Choose: 4
6. ∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
, ⊔z(z=s×s), ⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y) ◦– ⊔y(y=s3) Wait: 5
7. ∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
, ⊓y⊔z(z=s×y), ⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y) ◦– ⊔y(y=s3) ⊓-Choose: 6
8. ∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
, ⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y), ⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y) ◦– ⊔y(y=s3) ⊓-Choose: 7
9. ∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
, ⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y) ◦– ⊔y(y=s3) Replicate: 8
10. ∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
, ⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y) ◦– ⊓x⊔y(y=x3) Wait: 9
Example 9.2 The formula ∀xp(x)→⊓xp(x) is provable in CL12. It follows from ∀xp(x)→ p(y) by Wait.
The latter, in turn, follows by Wait from the empty set of premises.
On the other hand, the formula ⊓xp(x)→ ∀xp(x), i.e. ⊔x¬p(x) ∨ ∀xp(x), in not provable. Indeed, its
elementarization is ⊥ ∨ ∀xp(x), which is not classically valid. Hence ⊔x¬p(x) ∨ ∀xp(x) cannot be derived
by Wait. Replicate can also be dismissed for obvious reasons. This leaves us with ⊔-Choose. But if
⊔x¬p(x) ∨ ∀xp(x) is derived by ⊔-Choose, then the premise should be ¬p(t) ∨ ∀xp(x) for some variable or
constant t. The latter, however, is a classically non-valid elementary formula and hence unprovable.
Example 9.3 The formula ⊓x⊔y
(
p(x)→ p(y)
)
is provable in CL12 as follows:
1. p(s)→ p(s) Wait:
2. ⊔y
(
p(s)→ p(y)
)
⊔-Choose: 1
3. ⊓x⊔y
(
p(x)→ p(y)
)
Wait: 2
On the other hand, the formula⊔y⊓x
(
p(x)→ p(y)
)
can be seen to be unprovable, even though its classical
counterpart ∃y∀x
(
p(x)→ p(y)
)
is a classically valid elementary formula and hence provable in CL12.
Example 9.4 While the formula ∀x∃y
(
y=f(x)
)
is classically valid and hence provable in CL12, its con-
structive counterpart ⊓x⊔y
(
y=f(x)
)
can be easily seen to be unprovable. This is no surprise. In view
of the expected soundness of CL12, provability of ⊓x⊔y
(
y=f(x)
)
would imply that every function f is
computable, which, of course, is not the case.
Exercise 9.5 To see the resource-consciousness ofCL12, show that it does not prove p ⊓ q→ (p ⊓ q) ∧ (p ⊓ q),
even though this formula has the form F → F ∧F of a classical tautology. Then show that, in contrast,
CL12 proves the sequent p ⊓ q ◦– (p ⊓ q) ∧ (p ⊓ q) because, unlike the antecedent of a → -combination, the
antecedent of a ◦– -combination is reusable (trough Replicate).
Exercise 9.6 Show that CL12 ⊢ ⊔x⊓y p(x, y) ◦–⊔x
(
⊓y p(x, y) ∧⊓y p(x, y)
)
. Then observe that, on the
other hand, CL12 does not prove any of the formulas
⊔x⊓y p(x, y) → ⊔x
(
⊓y p(x, y) ∧⊓y p(x, y)
)
;
⊔x⊓y p(x, y) ∧ ⊔x⊓y p(x, y) → ⊔x
(
⊓y p(x, y) ∧⊓y p(x, y)
)
;
⊔x⊓y p(x, y) ∧ ⊔x⊓y p(x, y) ∧ ⊔x⊓y p(x, y) → ⊔x
(
⊓y p(x, y) ∧⊓y p(x, y)
)
;
. . .
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10 The adequacy of logic CL12
Logical Consequence (LC) is the following rule, with both the premises and the conclusion being formulas:
From E1, . . . , En conclude F , as long as CL12 proves E1, . . . , En ◦–F .
When F follows from E1, . . . , En by this rule, i.e., when CL12 ⊢ E1, . . . , En ◦– F , we say that F is a logical
consequence of E1, . . . , En.
The official terms of the language of CL12, identified with their parse trees, are tree-style structures,
so let us call them tree-terms. A more general and economical way to represent terms, however, is to
allow merging some or all identical-content nodes in such trees, thus turning them into (directed, acyclic,
rooted, edge-ordered multi-) graphs. Let us call these unofficial sorts of terms graph-terms. The idea
of representing linguistic objects in the form of graphs rather than trees is central in the approach called
cirquent calculus ([16, 23]), and has already proven its worth. We once again find the usefulness of that idea
in our present, complexity-sensitive context. Figure 1 illustrates two terms representing the same polynomial
function y8, with the term on the right being a tree-term and the term on the left being a graph-term. As
this example suggests, graph-terms are generally exponentially smaller than the corresponding tree-terms,
which explains our interest in the former. Figure 1 also makes it unnecessary to formally define graph-terms,
as their meaning must be perfectly clear after looking at this single example.
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Figure 1: A graph-term and the corresponding tree-term
By a polynomial graph-term τ we shall mean a graph-term not containing (at its leaves) any constants
other than 0, and not containing (at its internal nodes) any function letters other than ′ (unary), + (binary)
and × (binary). The total number k of the variables y1, . . . , yk occurring in (at the leaves of) τ is said to be
the arity of τ . Subsequently we shall only be interested in unary (1-ary) polynomial graph-terms, and will
typically omit the word “unary”. Terminologically and notationally we shall usually identify such a term τ
with the unary polynomial arithmetical function represented by it under the standard arithmetical interpre-
tation (x ′ means x+1). So, for instance, either term of Figure 1 is a polynomial graph-term, representing
— and identified with — the function y8.
We generalize the above concept of a (unary) polynomial graph-term τ to that of a (1, n)-ary explicit
polynomial functional by allowing the term τ to contain, on top of variables and 0, ′, + , × , additional
n (n ≥ 0) unary function letters f1, . . . , fn, semantically treated as placeholders for unary arithmetical
functions. We say that such a τ depends on f1, . . . , fn. Replacing f1, . . . , fn by names g1, . . . , gn of some
particular unary arithmetical functions turns τ into the corresponding unary arithmetical function, which we
shall denote by τ(g1, . . . , gn). For instance, the term of Figure 2 is a (1, 2)-ary explicit polynomial functional.
Let us denote it by τ . Then, if g means “square” and h means “cube”, τ(g, h) is the unary arithmetical
function (y2+y3)3.
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Figure 2: An explicit polynomial functional expressing f2
(
f1(y)+f2(y)
)
We further generalize the concept of a (unary) polynomial graph-term τ to that of a (unary) explicit
polynomial function. The latter is defined as a nonempty sequence 〈τf1 , . . . , τfk〉 of explicit polynomial
functionals indexed by (associated with) pairwise distinct unary function letters f1, . . . , fk, where each τfi
does not depend on any function letters that are not among f1, . . . , fi−1. Note that this condition makes
τf1 simply a polynomial graph-term, i.e., a (1, 0)-ary explicit polynomial functional. (Meta)semantically,
each index fi here is a name of (represents) a unary arithmetical function, and the corresponding τfi is a
definition of that function in terms of 0, ′, + , × and some earlier-defined functions; then τ itself is stipulated
to represent the same function as fk does. Again, a single example would be sufficient to fully clarify the
denotation of each explicit polynomial function. Consider the explicit polynomial function τ = 〈τf1 , τf1 , τf3〉,
where τf1 and τf2 are the (1, 0)-ary explicit polynomial functionals of Figure 1, and τf3 is the (1, 2)-ary explicit
polynomial functional of Figure 2. Thus, both f1 and f2 represent the same unary polynomial function y
8,
and f3, i.e. τ itself, represents the unary polynomial function (y
8+y8)8. Of course, every explicit polynomial
function can be translated into an equivalent polynomial graph-term, but such a translation can increase
the size exponentially. For our purposes, polynomial graph-terms (let alone tree-terms) are too inefficient
means of representing polynomial functions. This explains our preference for explicit polynomial functions
as a standard way of writing (in our metalanguage) polynomial terms.
As in the case of polynomial graph-terms, terminologically and notationally we shall usually identify an
explicit polynomial function τ with the unary arithmetical function represented by it. When τ is an explicit
polynomial function and M is a τ time (resp. space) machine, we say that τ is an explicit polynomial
bound for the time (resp. space) complexity of M.
Another auxiliary concept that we are going to rely on in this section and later is that of a generalized
HPM (GHPM). For a natural number n, an n-ary GHPM is defined in the same way as an HPM, with
the difference that the former takes n natural numbers as inputs (say, provided on a separate, read-only
input tape); such inputs are present at the very beginning of the work of the machine and remain unchanged
throughout it. An ordinary HPM is thus nothing but a 0-ary GHPM. When M is an n-ary GHPM and
c1, . . . , cn are natural numbers,M(c1, . . . , cn) denotes the HPM that works just likeM in the scenario where
the latter has received c1, . . . , cn as inputs. We will assume that some reasonable encoding (through natural
numbers) of GHPMs is fixed. When M is a GHPM, pMq denotes its code.
The paper [29] established the soundness of CL12 in the following strong sense:
Theorem 10.1 ([29]) If a formula F is a logical consequence of formulas E1, . . . , En and
∗ is an interpre-
tation such that each E∗i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is computable, then so is F
∗. Furthermore:
1. There is an efficient6 procedure that takes an arbitrary CL12-proof of an arbitrary sequent E1, . . . , En ◦–F
and constructs a n-ary GHPM M, together with a (1, n)-ary explicit polynomial functional τ , such
that, for any interpretation ∗, any n-ary GHPMs N1, . . . ,Nn and any unary arithmetical functions
g1, . . . , gn, if each Ni(pN1q, . . . , pNnq) is a gi time solution of E
∗
i , then M(pN1q, . . . , pNnq) is a
τ(g1, . . . , gn) time solution of F
∗.
2. The same holds for “space” instead of “time”.
Among the corollaries of the above theorem is that LC preserves both polynomial time and polynomial
space computabilities, as well as Ω-time and Ω-space computabilities for any class Ω of functions containing
6Here and later in similar metacontexts, “efficient” means “polynomial time”.
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all polynomial functions and closed under composition (such as, say, the class of all primitive recursive
functions). Indeed, to see that LC preserves (for instance) polynomial time computability, assume F is a
logical consequence of E1, . . . , En, and the HPMs N1, . . . ,Nn are polynomial time solutions of E1, . . . , En.
Of course, every such HPM Ni can as well be seen as an n-ary GHPM which simply ignores its inputs.
So, each Ni(pN1q, . . . , pNnq) solves Ei. Then, according to Theorem 10.1, we can construct a polynomial
time solution M(pN1q, . . . , pNnq) of F . Furthermore, such a solution, together with an explicit polynomial
bound for its time complexity, can be efficiently extracted from N1, . . . ,Nn, explicit polynomial bounds for
their time complexities, and the CL12-proof of E1, . . . , En ◦–F .
Remember that, philosophically speaking, computational resources are symmetric to computational prob-
lems: what is a problem for one player to solve is a resource that the other player can use. Namely, having
a problem A as a computational resource intuitively means having the ability to successfully solve/win A.
For instance, as a resource, ⊓x⊔y(y = x2) means the ability to tell the square of any number.
Together with soundness, [29] also established the completeness of CL12. While in the present paper
we treat ◦– merely as a syntactic expression separating the two parts of a sequent, in [29] it is seen as an
operation on games, called ultimate reduction. For simplicity considerations, we do not want to reproduce
the definition of ◦– here, which would be necessary to precisely state the completeness result for CL12. We
shall only point out that, intuitively, A1, . . . , An ◦–B is (indeed) the problem of reducing B to A1, . . . , An
in the most general intuitive sense. It is similar to A1 ∧ . . . ∧An→B, but with the difference that, during
playing this game, in the former ⊤ can use any of the antecedental resources Ai repeatedly, while in the
latter at most once. The Ais, as resources, are “recyclable”, that is. Furthermore, they are “recyclable”
in the strongest sense possible. Namely, it is not necessary to restart Ai from the beginning every time it
is reused. ⊤ may as well choose to continue Ai — in a new way — from any of the previously reached
positions. This corresponds to the way of reusage any purely software resource would offer in the presence
of an advanced operating system and unlimited memory: one can start running process Ai, then fork it at
any stage thus creating two copies (branches) with a common past but possibly diverging futures, then fork
any of the new branches again at any time, and so on. See [26] or [29] for more details and explanations.
Anyway, the completeness result of [29] for CL12 says that, if there is an HPM that solves the problem
E∗1 , . . . , E
∗
n ◦–F ∗ for any interpretation ∗ — such an ∗-independent HPM is said to be a logical solution of
the sequent E1, . . . , En ◦– F — then CL12 ⊢ E1, . . . , En ◦–F . Furthermore, the same has been shown to
hold even if HPMs are no longer required to follow algorithmic (let alone efficient) strategies — for instance,
if they are allowed to use oracles for whatever functions. This result, in view of the intuitions captured by
the operation ◦– , eventually translates in [29] into the following thesis relevant to our further purposes:
Thesis 10.2 ([29]) Assume E1, . . . , En, F are formulas such that there is a
∗-independent (whatever inter-
pretation ∗) intuitive description and justification of a winning strategy for F ∗, which relies on the availability
and “recyclability” — in the strongest sense possible — of E∗1 , . . . , E
∗
n as computational resources. Then F
is a logical consequence of E1, . . . , En.
The above means that the rule of Logical Consequence lives up to its name, and that we can always
reliably use intuition on games and strategies when reasoning about them in CL12-based systems (where
LC is a rule of inference) such as CLA4. Namely, once a formula E is proven in such a system, it can be
treated as a recyclable resource whose unlimited availability can be safely assumed for any new strategies
that we construct. More precisely, a new strategy may assume that there is an (external) provider of the
resource E (call it an oracle for E if you prefer), capable of successfully playing E for (against) us any time
and in any number of sessions, whether we choose those sessions to evolve in a parallel or a branched/forked
fashion.
Example 10.3 Imagine a CL12-based applied formal theory, in which we have already proven two facts:
∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
(the meaning of “cube” in terms of multiplication) and ⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y) (the com-
putability of multiplication), and now we want to derive ⊓x⊔y(y=x3) (the computability of “cube”). This
is how we can reason to justify ⊓x⊔y(y=x3):
Consider any s (selected by Environment for x in ⊓x⊔y(y=x3)). We need to find s3. Using the
resource ⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y) twice, we first find the value t of s×s, and then the value r of t×s.
According to ∀x(x3 =(x×x)×x), such an r is the sought s3.
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Thesis 10.2 promises that the above intuitive argument will be translatable into a CL12-proof of
∀x
(
x3=(x×x)×x
)
, ⊓x⊓y⊔z(z=x×y) ◦– ⊓x⊔y(y=x3)
(and hence the succedent will be derivable in the theory by LC as the formulas of the antecedent are already
proven). Such a proof indeed exists — see Example 9.1.
CL12 — more precisely, the associated rule of LC — is adequate because, on one hand, by Theorem
10.1, it is sound for a wide spectrum of applied theories, including — but not limited to — polynomial-
time-oriented ones, and, on the other hand, by Thesis 10.2, it is as strong as a logical rule of inference could
possibly be.
11 Theory CLA4 introduced
The language ofCLA4, whose formulasmore specifically can be referred to asCLA4-formulas, is obtained
from the language ofCL12 by removing all nonlogical predicate letters (thus only leaving the logical predicate
letter =), removing all constants but 0, and removing all but three function letters, which are:
• successor, unary. We will write τ ′ for successor(τ).
• sum, binary. We will write τ1+τ2 for sum(τ1, τ2).
• product, binary. We will write τ1×τ2 for product(τ1, τ2).
Thus, the language of CLA4 extends that of Peano arithmetic PA (see, for example, [11]) through
adding to it ⊓ , ⊔ ,⊔,⊓. Formulas that have no free occurrences of variables are said to be sentences.
The concept of an interpretation explained earlier can now be restricted to interpretations that are
only defined on ′, + and × , as the present language has no other nonlogical function or predicate letters.
Of such interpretations, the standard interpretation † is the one whose universe is the ideal universe
{0, 1, 10, 11, 100, . . .}, with its elements identified with the corresponding natural numbers, and which inter-
prets ′ as the standard successor (x+1) function, interprets + as the sum function, and interprets × as the
product function. For a CLA4-formula F , the standard interpretation of F is the game F †, which we
typically write simply as F unless doing so may cause ambiguity.
Where τ is a term, we will be using τ0 and τ1 as abbreviations for the terms 0 ′ ′×τ and (0 ′ ′×τ) ′,
respectively. The choice of this notation is related to the fact that, given any natural number a, the binary
representation of 0 ′ ′×a (i.e., of 2a) is nothing but the binary representation of a with a “0” added on its right.
Similarly, the binary representation of (0 ′ ′×a) ′ is nothing but the binary representation of a with a “1”
added to it. Of course, here an exception is the case a=0. It can be made an ordinary case by assuming that
adding any number of 0s at the beginning of a binary numeral b results in a legitimate numeral representing
the same number as b does.
The number a0 (i.e. 2a) will be said to be the binary 0-successor of a, and a1 (i.e. 2a + 1) said to
be the binary 1-successor of a; in turn, we can refer to a as the binary predecessor of a0 and a1. As
for a ′, we can refer to it as the unary successor of a, and refer to a as the unary predecessor of a ′.
Every number has a binary predecessor, and every number except 0 has a unary predecessor. Note that the
binary predecessor of a number is the result of deleting the last digit (if present) in its binary representation.
Remember that the string 0 for us is just another name of the empty string ǫ representing the number zero.
So, 0 and 1 are no exceptions to the above rule: deleting the last (and only) digit of 1 results in ǫ; and
“deleting the last digit” in 0, i.e. in ǫ, again results in ǫ, as there is no digit to delete.
The language of PA is known to be very expressive, despite its nonlogical vocabulary officially being
limited to only 0, ′, + , × . Specifically, it allows us to express, in a certain standard way, all recursive
functions and relations, and beyond. Relying on the common knowledge of the power of the language of
PA, we will be using standard expressions such as x≤y, y>x, etc. in formulas as abbreviations of the
corresponding proper expressions of the language. In our metalanguage, |x| will refer to the length of the
binary numeral for the number represented by x. In other words, |x|=⌈log2(x+1)⌉ (⌈y⌉ means the smallest
integer z with y≤z). Expressions like |x| we refer to as pseudoterms — officially they are not terms of
the object language, but in many contexts still can be treated as such. Another example of a pseudoterm
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is 2x with its standard meaning. So, when we write, say, “|x|≤y”, it is officially to be understood as an
abbreviation of a standard formula of PA saying that |x| does not exceed y.
For a variable x, by a polynomial sizebound for x we shall mean a standard formula of the language of
PA saying that |x|≤τ(|y1|, . . . , |yn|), where y1, . . . , yn are any variables different from x, and τ(|y1|, . . . , |yn|)
is any (0, ′, + , ×)-combination of |y1|, . . . , |yn|. For instance, |x|≤ |y|+ |z| is a polynomial sizebound for x,
which is a formula of PA saying that the size of x does not exceed the sum of the sizes of y and z. Now, we
say that a CLA4-formula F is polynomially bounded iff:
• Whenever ⊓xG(x) is a subformula of F , G(x) has the form S(x)→H(x), where S(x) is a polynomial
sizebound for x.
• Whenever ⊔xG(x) is a subformula of F , G(x) has the form S(x) ∧H(x), where S(x) is a polynomial
sizebound for x.
Remember that, where F is a formula, ∀F means the ∀-closure of F , i.e., ∀x1 . . .∀xnF , where x1, . . . , xn
are the free variables of F . Similarly for ∃F , ⊓F , ⊔F .
The axioms of CLA4 are:
Axiom 1: ∀x(0 6=x ′)
Axiom 2: ∀x∀y(x ′ =y ′ → x=y)
Axiom 3: ∀x(x+0=x)
Axiom 4: ∀x∀y
(
x+y ′ =(x+y) ′
)
Axiom 5: ∀x(x×0=0)
Axiom 6: ∀x∀y
(
x×y ′ =(x×y)+x
)
Axiom 7: ∀
(
F (0) ∧ ∀x
(
F (x)→ F (x ′)
)
→ ∀xF (x)
)
for each elementary formula F (x)
Axiom 8: ⊓x⊔y(y=x ′)
Axiom 9: ⊓x⊔y(y=x0)
All of the above are thus nonlogical axioms (CLA4 has no logical axioms). Note that the overall number
of axioms is infinite rather than nine, because Axiom 7 is not a particular sentence but a scheme of sentences.
Axioms 1-7 are nothing but Peano axioms— the nonlogical axioms of PA. CLA4 thus only has two extra-
Peano axioms: Axiom 8 and Axiom 9. In view of the forthcoming soundness theorem for CLA4, Axiom
8 says that the unary successor function is polynomial time computable, and Axiom 9 says the same about
the binary 0-successor function.
As for the rules of inference, CLA4 has a single logical rule, which is our old friend Logical Conse-
quence, and a single nonlogical rule, which we call CLA4-Induction. The latter is
⊓
(
F (0)
)
⊓
(
F (x)→ F (x0)
)
⊓
(
F (x)→ F (x1)
)
⊓
(
F (x)
) ,
where F (x) is any polynomially bounded formula.
Here we shall say that ⊓
(
F (0)
)
is the basis of induction, ⊓
(
F (x)→ F (x0)
)
is the left inductive step,
and ⊓
(
F (x)→ F (x1)
)
is the right inductive step. The variable x has a special status here, and we say
that the conclusion follows from the premises by CLA4-Induction on x. A reader familiar with Buss’s
[6] bounded arithmetic will notice a resemblance between the PIND axiom scheme of the latter and our
CLA4-Induction rule, even though the two beasts operate in very different environments, of course.
A sentence F is considered provable in CLA4 iff there is a sequence of sentences, called a CLA4-proof
of F , where each sentence is either an axiom, or follows from some previous sentences by one of the two
rules of inference, and where the last sentence is F . An extended CLA4-proof is defined in the same way,
only, with the additional requirement that each application of LC should come together with an attached
CL12-proof of the corresponding sequent. With some fixed, effective, sound and complete axiomatization L
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of classical first order logic in mind, a superextended CLA4-proof is an extended CLA4-proof with the
additional requirement that every application of Wait in the justification of a CL12-derivation in it comes
with an L-proof of the elementarization of the conclusion. Note that the property of being a superextended
proof is (efficiently) decidable, while the properties of being an extended proof or just a proof are only
recursively enumerable. We write CLA4 ⊢ F to say that F is provable (has a proof) in CLA4, and
CLA4 6⊢ F to say the opposite.
Generally, as in the above definition of provability and proofs, in CLA4 we will only be interested in
proving sentences.7 So, for technical convenience, we agree that, from now on, whenever we write CLA4 ⊢ F
(or say “F is provable”) for a non-sentence F , it simply means that CLA4 ⊢ ⊓F . Similarly, when we say
that a given strategy solves F , it is to be understood as that the strategy solves ⊓F . Similarly, when we say
that F is a logical consequence of E1, . . . , En, what we typically mean is that ⊓F is a logical consequence of
⊓E1, . . . ,⊓En. To summarize, in the context ofCLA4, any formula with free variables should be understood
as its ⊓-closure. An exception is when F (x1, . . . , xn) is an elementary formula and we say that F (c1, . . . , cn)
is true (whatever constants c1, . . . , cn). This is to be understood as that the ∀-closure ∀F (c1, . . . , cn) of
F (c1, . . . , cn) is true (in the standard model), for “truth” is only meaningful for elementary formulas (which
⊓F generally would not be). An important fact on which we will often rely yet only implicitly so, is that the
sentence ∀F →⊓F or the closed sequent ∀F ◦–⊓F is (always) CL12-provable. In view of the soundness of
CL12, this means that whenever (F is elementary and) ∀F is true, ⊓F is automatically won by a strategy
that does nothing.
Example 11.1 The following sequence is a proof of ⊓x⊔y(y=x1), i.e. of ⊓x⊔y
(
y=(x0) ′
)
— the sentence
saying that the binary 1-successor function is computable:
I. ⊓x⊔y(y=x ′) Axiom 8
II. ⊓x⊔y(y=x0) Axiom 9
III. ⊓x⊔y
(
y=(x0) ′
)
LC: I,II
An extended version of the above proof would have to include a justification for step III where LC was
used, such as the following one:
1. t=r ′, r=s0 ◦– t=(s0) ′ Wait:
2. t=r ′, r=s0 ◦– ⊔y
(
y=(s0) ′
)
⊔-Choose: 1
3. ⊔y(y=r ′), r=s0 ◦– ⊔y
(
y=(s0) ′
)
Wait: 2
4. ⊓x⊔y(y=x ′), r=s0 ◦– ⊔y
(
y=(s0) ′
)
⊓-Choose: 3
5. ⊓x⊔y(y=x ′), ⊔y(y=s0) ◦– ⊔y
(
y=(s0) ′
)
Wait: 4
6. ⊓x⊔y(y=x ′), ⊓x⊔y(y=x0) ◦– ⊔y
(
y=(s0) ′
)
⊓-Choose: 5
7. ⊓x⊔y(y=x ′), ⊓x⊔y(y=x0) ◦– ⊓x⊔y
(
y=(x0) ′
)
Wait:
As we just saw, (additionally) justifying an application of LC takes more space than the (non-extended)
proof itself. And this would be a typical case for CLA4-proofs. Luckily, however, there is no real need to
formally justify LC. Firstly, this is so because CL12 is an analytic system, and proof-search in it is a routine
(even if sometimes long) syntactic exercise. Secondly, in view of Thesis 10.2, there is no need to generate
formal CL12-proofs anyway: instead, we can use intuition on games and strategies. In the present case,
the whole (III+7)-step extended formal proof can be replaced by a short intuitive argument in the following
style:
Consider any s chosen by Environment for x. We need to compute (s0) ′. Using Axiom 9, we
find the value r of s0. Then, using Axiom 8, we find the value t of r ′. Such a t is what we are
looking for.
Furthermore, as we agreed to understand a proof of a non-sentence F as a proof of its ⊓-closure ⊓F ,
the above argument can be shortened by considering simply ⊔y(y=x1) instead of ⊓x⊔y(y=x1). This would
allow us to skip the phrase “Consider any s chosen by Environment for x” and the necessity to introduce
7In case we do not insist that every formula in an CLA4-proof be a sentence, one could show that, if F is not a sentence,
it is provable (in this relaxed sense) if and only if its ⊓ -closure is so, anyway.
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the new name/variable s. Instead, we can simply say “Consider any x”, implicitly letting x itself serve as a
variable for the value chosen by Environment for x when playing the ⊓-closure of the game. Sometimes we
can go even lazier and skip the phrase “Consider any x” altogether.
In view of the following fact, an alternative way to present CLA4 would be to delete Axioms 1-7 and,
instead, declare all (closed) theorems of PA to be axioms of CLA4 along with Axioms 8 and 9:
Fact 11.2 Every (elementary CLA4-) sentence provable in PA is also provable in CLA4.
Proof. Suppose (the classical-logic-based) PA proves F . By the deduction theorem for classical logic
this means that, for some nonlogical axioms H1, . . . , Hn of PA, the formula H1 ∧ . . . ∧Hn→ F is provable
in classical first order logic. Hence H1 ∧ . . . ∧Hn ◦–F is provable in CL12 by Wait from the empty set
of premises. Hence F is a logical consequence of the Peano axioms H1, . . . , Hn of CLA4 and, as such, is
provable by LC.
The above fact, on which we will be implicitly relying in the sequel, allows us to construct “lazy” CLA4-
proofs where some steps can be justified by simply indicating their provability in PA. That is, we will treat
theorems of PA as if they were axioms of CLA4. As PA is well known and well studied, we safely assume
that the reader has a good feel for what it can prove, so we do not usually further justify PA-provability
claims that we make. A reader less familiar with PA, can take it as a rule of thumb that, despite Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorems, PA proves every true number-theoretic fact that a contemporary high school
student can establish, or that mankind was or could be aware of before 1931.
Example 11.3 The following sequence is a lazy proof of ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0) — the formula saying that the
“zeroness” predicate is decidable:
I. 0=0 ⊔ 0 6=0 LC:
II. ∀x(x=0→ x0=0) PA
III. ∀x(x 6=0→ x0 6=0) PA
IV. ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0→ x0=0 ⊔ x0 6=0) LC: II,III
V. ∀x(x1 6=0) PA
VI. ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0→ x1=0 ⊔ x1 6=0) LC: V
VII. ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0) CLA4-Induction: I,IV,VI
An extended version of the above proof will include the following three additional justifications (CL12-
proofs):
A justification for Step I:
1. 0=0 Wait:
2. 0=0 ⊔ 0 6=0 ⊔ -Choose: 1
A justification for Step IV:
1. ∀x(x=0→ x0=0), ∀x(x 6=0→ x0 6=0) ◦– s=0→ s0=0 Wait:
2. ∀x(x=0→ x0=0), ∀x(x 6=0→ x0 6=0) ◦– s=0→ s0=0 ⊔ s0 6=0 ⊔ -Choose: 1
3. ∀x(x=0→ x0=0), ∀x(x 6=0→ x0 6=0) ◦– s 6=0→ s0 6=0 Wait:
4. ∀x(x=0→ x0=0), ∀x(x 6=0→ x0 6=0) ◦– s 6=0→ s0=0 ⊔ s0 6=0 ⊔ -Choose: 3
5. ∀x(x=0→ x0=0), ∀x(x 6=0→ x0 6=0) ◦– s=0 ⊔ s 6=0→ s0=0 ⊔ s0 6=0 Wait: 2,4
6. ∀x(x=0→ x0=0), ∀x(x 6=0→ x0 6=0) ◦– ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ s 6=0→ x0=0 ⊔ x0 6=0) Wait: 5
A justification for Step VI:
1. ∀x(x1 6=0) ◦– s=0→ s1 6=0 Wait:
2. ∀x(x1 6=0) ◦– s 6=0→ s1 6=0 Wait:
3. ∀x(x1 6=0) ◦– s=0 ⊔ s 6=0→ s1 6=0 Wait: 1,2
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4. ∀x(x1 6=0) ◦– s=0 ⊔ s 6=0→ s1=0 ⊔ s1 6=0 ⊔ -Choose: 3
5. ∀x(x1 6=0) ◦– ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0→ x1=0 ⊔ x1 6=0) Wait: 4
But, again, in the sequel we will not generate formal (even if lazy) proofs in the above style but, in-
stead, limit ourselves to informal arguments within CLA4. Below we illustrate such an argument for the
present case. Further, as explained in the previous example, we prefer to deal with x=0 ⊔ x 6=0 rather than
⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0), and do not explicitly say “consider any value x chosen for the variable x by Environment”.
We prove x=0 ⊔ x 6=0 by CL12-Induction on x.
The Basis 0=0 ⊔ 0 6=0 of induction is straightforward: it is solved by choosing the left ⊔ -disjunct.
Solving the left inductive step x=0 ⊔ x 6=0→ x0=0 ⊔ x0 6=0 means solving the consequent using a single
copy of the antecedent as a resource. From PA, we know that x0=0 iff x=0. And whether x=0 or not we
can find out using the resource x=0 ⊔ x 6=0. So, we can tell whether x0=0 or ( ⊔ ) x0 6=0, as desired.
The right inductive step x=0 ⊔ x 6=0→ x1=0 ⊔ x1 6=0 is solved by simply choosing the right ⊔ -disjunct in
the consequent which, by PA, is true.
In the future, our reliance on PA may not always be explicit as it was in the above informal argu-
ment. Further, as we advance, our reliance on some basic nonelementary facts such as the just-proven
⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0) may increasingly become only implicit.
Why did not we use the following, much simpler intuitive argument instead of the above one?
To solve x=0 ⊔ x 6=0, see if x (the constant chosen by Environment for x) is 0 or not. If yes,
choose the left ⊔ -disjunct; otherwise choose the right ⊔ -disjunct.
The above argument is not valid, in the sense that it is not “purely logical”, and hence Thesis 10.2 does
not guarantee that it will be translatable into a formal proof. Namely, in being confident that the above
strategy wins the game, we rely on the extra-logical knowledge of the fact that different constants are names
of different objects. This is indeed so for the standard model of arithmetic. But in some other models it is
quite possible that, say, both constants 0 and 10 are names for the same object of the universe. Then, the
above strategy prescribes to choose the false 10 6=0 in the corresponding scenario.
Thus, ⊓x(x=0 ⊔ x 6=0), while provable in CLA4, is not logically valid, that is, is not provable in CL12.
The same applies to the more general principle ⊓x⊓y(x=y ⊔ x 6=y), whose CLA4-provability is shown later
in Section 12.
When a formula F (x1, . . . , xn) is a standard (in whatever informal sense) representation of an n-ary
predicate p and CLA4 ⊢ ⊓
(
F (x1, . . . , xn) ⊔ ¬F (x1, . . . , xn)
)
, we say that p is CLA4-provably decid-
able. Similarly, when F (y, x1, . . . , xn) is a standard representation of the graph of an n-ary function f
and CLA4 ⊢ ⊓⊔yF (y, x1, . . . , xn), we say that f is CLA4-provably computable. Since CLA4 is the
only system of clarithmetic dealt with in this paper, the prefix “CLA4” before “provably” can be safely
omitted. So, for instance, Example 11.3 established the provable decidability of the “zeroness” predicate,
and Example 11.1 established the provable computability of the binary 1-successor function. The same ter-
minology extends to partially defined functions as well. For instance, the later-proven Fact 12.3 shows that
CLA4 ⊢ ⊓x
(
x 6=0→⊔y(x=y ′)
)
. We understand this as the provable computability of the (partial) unary
predecessor function.
Exercise 11.4 Let Even(x) be an abbreviation of ∃z(x=z+z), and Odd(x) be an abbreviation of ¬Even(x).
Find a lazy CLA4-proof of ∀x
(
Even(x) ⊔Odd(x)→⊓y
(
Even(x+y) ⊔Odd(x+y)
))
. Hint: Relying on the
PA-provable fact that x0 is always even and x1 is always odd, byCLA4-Induction prove⊓x
(
Even(x) ⊔Odd(x)
)
.
The target sentence is a logical consequence of the latter and the PA-provable fact that the sum of two num-
bers is even iff both numbers are even or both are odd.
By an arithmetical problem in this paper we mean a game A such that, for some sentence F of
the language of CLA4, A = F † (remember that † is the standard interpretation). Such a sentence F is
said a representation of A. We say that an arithmetical problem A is provable in CLA4 iff it has a
CLA4-provable representation. In these terms, a central result of the present paper sounds as follows:
Theorem 11.5 An arithmetical problem has a polynomial time solution iff it is provable in CLA4.
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Furthermore, there is an efficient procedure that takes an arbitrary extended CLA4-proof of an arbitrary
sentence X and constructs a solution of X (of X†, that is) together with an explicit polynomial bound for
its time complexity.
Proof. The soundness (“if”) part of this theorem will be proven in Section 13, and the completeness
(“only if”) part in Section 14.
12 Some more taste of CLA4
In this section we establish several CLA4-provability facts. In view of the soundness of CLA4, each such
fact tells us about the efficient solvability of the associated number-theoretic computational problem.
As mentioned, the present work has been written not merely as a research paper but also as an advanced
tutorial on CoL-based applied theories. The series of proofs given in this section can be treated as exercises
aimed at developing the reader’s feel for CoL-based systems and CLA4 in particular. But these proofs also
provide certain necessary results relied upon later, in our proof of the extensional completeness of CLA4.
As noted earlier, we shall exclusively rely on informal reasoning in CLA4, remembering that behind
every such piece of reasoning is a formal CLA4-proof.
Fact 12.1 CLA4 ⊢ ⊔y(y= |x|) (i.e., CLA4 ⊢ ⊓x⊔y(y= |x|)).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on x, we first want to prove ⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ y= |x|).
The basis ⊔y(|y|≤ |0| ∧ y= |0|) is solved by selecting 0 for y. Such a move brings the game down to
|0|≤0 ∧ 0= |0|. From PA, we know that the latter is true. So, we win.
The left inductive step is ⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ y= |x|)→⊔y(|y|≤ |x0| ∧ y= |x0|). Using Example 11.3, we figure
our whether x=0 or not. If x=0, then (we know from PA that) |x0| = 0, so we win the game by selecting
0 for y in the consequent. Now suppose x 6=0. We wait till Environment selects a constant a for y in the
antecedent8 (if this does not happen, we win). Then, using Axiom 8, we compute the value (constant) b with
b=a ′, and choose b for y in the consequent. We win because, from PA, we know that when x is not 0, the
resulting position |a|≤ |x| ∧ a= |x|→ |b|≤ |x0| ∧ b= |x0|, i.e. |a|≤ |x| ∧ a= |x|→ |a ′|≤ |x0| ∧ a ′ = |x0| (whatever
the value of x is) is true. The right inductive step is similar but simpler, as we do not need to separately
consider the case of x=0.
So, we know how to win (the ⊓-closure of) ⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ y= |x|). But then, of course, ignoring the
|y|≤ |x| conjunct, we also know how to win (the ⊓-closure of the weaker) ⊔y(y= |x|). Putting it in pre-
cise terms, ⊓x⊔y(y= |x|) is an (easy) logical consequence of ⊓x⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ y= |x|) — that is, the sequent
⊓x⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ y= |x|) ◦–⊓x⊔y(y= |x|) is (easily) provable in CL12.
Compare the ⊓-closures of the following formulas:
∃y(x=y0 ∨ x=y1) (5)
⊔y(x=y0 ∨ x=y1) (6)
∃y(x=y0 ⊔ x=y1) (7)
⊔y(x=y0 ⊔ x=y1) (8)
All four sentences “say the same” about the arbitrary (⊓) number represented by x, but in different ways.
(5) is the weakest, least informative, of the four. It says that x has a binary predecessor y, and that x is
even (i.e., is the binary 0-successor of its binary predecessor) or odd (i.e., is the binary 1-successor of its
binary predecessor). This is an almost trivial piece of information. (6) and (7) carry stronger information.
According to (6), x not just merely has a binary predecessor y, but such a predecessor can be actually and
efficiently found. (7) strengthens (5) in another way. It says that x can be efficiently determined to be even
8In informal arguments like this, we usually do not try to be consistent in using different metavariables for constants and
variables. Notice that the status of x in the present informal argument is also “constant” (chosen by Environment for the
variable x) just like the status of a but we, out of reluctance to introduce new names, continue using the expression “x” for it,
even though in earlier sections we tried to reserve the metanames x, y, z, . . . (as opposed to a, b, c, . . .) for variables rather than
constants.
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or odd. As for (8), it is the strongest. It carries two pieces of good news at once: we can efficiently find
the binary predecessor y of x and, simultaneously, tell whether x is even or odd. According to the following
fact, (8) is provable. As we may guess, so are the weaker (7), (6), (5).
Fact 12.2 CLA4 ⊢ ⊔y(x=y0 ⊔ x=y1).
Proof. Argue inCLA4. ByCLA4-Induction on x, we first want to prove⊔y
(
|y|≤ |x| ∧ (x=y0 ⊔ x=y1)
)
.
The basis ⊔y
(
|y|≤ |0| ∧ (0=y0 ⊔ 0=y1)
)
is obviously solved by selecting 0 for y and then choosing the
left ⊔ -disjunct, which results in the true (according to PA) sentence |0|≤ |0| ∧ 0=00. The left inductive
step ⊔y(x=y0 ⊔ x=y1)→⊔y(x0=y0 ⊔ x0=y1) is solved by selecting for y the same constant as the one
selected by Environment for x, and then choosing the left ⊔ -disjunct. Similarly, the right inductive step
⊔y(x=y0 ⊔ x=y1)→⊔y(x1=y0 ⊔ x1=y1) is solved by selecting for y the same constant as the one selected
by Environment for x, and then choosing the right ⊔ -disjunct.
Now, ⊔y(x=y0 ⊔ x=y1) is a straightforward logical consequence of ⊔y
(
|y|≤ |x| ∧ (x=y0 ⊔ x=y1)
)
.
The preceding fact established the provable computability of binary predecessor. The following fact does
the same for unary predecessor:
Fact 12.3 CLA4 ⊢ x 6=0→⊔y(x=y ′).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on x, we want to prove x 6=0→⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ x=y ′), from
which the target x 6=0→⊔y(x=y ′) follows immediately by LC.
The basis 0 6=0→⊔y(|y|≤ |0| ∧ 0=y ′) is solved trivially by a strategy that does nothing. A win is guar-
anteed because the antecedent is false.
The left inductive step is
(
x 6=0→⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ x=y ′)
)
→
(
x0 6=0→⊔y(|y|≤ |x0| ∧ x0=y ′)
)
. If x0 6=0 (and
if not, we win the game), then — according to PA — x 6=0. So, Environment will have to choose a constant
a for y in the antecedent, or else it loses. We may assume that a is (indeed) the unary predecessor of x, or
else, again, having chosen a wrong a, Environment loses. We know from PA that then the unary predecessor
b of x0 equals a1, and that |b|≤ |x0|. This b can be computed using (the resource provided by) Example
11.1. We choose b for y in the consequent and win.
The right inductive step
(
x 6=0→⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ x=y ′)
)
→
(
x1 6=0→⊔y(|y|≤ |x1| ∧ x1=y ′)
)
is even easier
to handle. Prom PA, the unary predecessor of x1 is x0, and |x0|≤ |x1|. Using Axiom 9, we compute the
value b of x0 and choose b for y in the consequent.
Fact 12.4 CLA4 ⊢ ⊔z(z=x+y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on x, we want to prove
⊓y
(
|y|≤ |t|→⊔z(|z|≤ |x|+ |y| ∧ z=x+y)
)
,
from which, together with the PA-provable fact ∀y(|y|≤ |y|), the target ⊔z(z=x+y) follows by LC.
The basis is ⊓y
(
|y|≤ |t|→⊔z(|z|≤ |0|+ |y| ∧ z=0+y)
)
, which (as always) we prefer to simply write as
|y|≤ |t|→⊔z(|z|≤ |0|+ |y| ∧ z=0+y). It is won by selecting (the value of) y for z, because we know, from PA,
that the resulting |y|≤ |t|→ |y|≤ |0|+ |y| ∧ y=0+y) is true.
In inductive steps, we will rely on the fact that PA proves (the ∀-closures of) the following formulas:
s0+r0=(s+r)0, i.e., 2s+2r=2(s+r); (9)
s0+r1=(s+r)1, i.e., 2s+(2r+1)=2(s+r)+1; (10)
s1+r0=(s+r)1, i.e., (2s+1)+2r=2(s+r)+1; (11)
s1+r1=
(
(s+r)1
)
′, i.e., (2s+1)+(2r+1)=
(
2(s+r)+1
)
+1. (12)
The left inductive step is
⊓y
(
|y|≤ |t|→⊔z(|z|≤ |x|+ |y| ∧ z=x+y)
)
→⊓y
(
|y|≤ |t|→⊔z(|z|≤ |x0|+ |y| ∧ z=x0+y)
)
. (13)
28
To solve it, we wait till Environment chooses a constant a for y in the consequent, after which (13) will be
brought down to
⊓y
(
|y|≤ |t|→⊔z(|z|≤ |x|+ |y| ∧ z=x+y)
)
→
(
|a|≤ |t|→⊔z(|z|≤ |x0|+ |a| ∧ z=x0+a)
)
. (14)
Using Fact 12.2, we find the binary predecessor b of a, for which we will also know whether a=b0 or (“or” in
the strong sense of ⊔ ) a=b1. We specify y as b in the antecedent of (14), and wait till Environment selects
a value c for z there.
If a=b0, the game by now will be brought down to
(
|b|≤ |t|→ (|c|≤ |x|+ |b| ∧ c=x+b)
)
→
(
|b0|≤ |t|→⊔z(|z|≤ |x0|+ |b0| ∧ z=x0+b0)
)
.
Using Axiom 9, we compute the value d of c0, and specify z as d in the consequent. The resulting position
(
|b|≤ |t|→ (|c|≤ |x|+ |b| ∧ c=x+b)
)
→
(
|b0|≤ |t|→ |c0|≤ |x0|+ |b0| ∧ c0=x0+b0
)
,
in view of (9) (and certain additional, straightforward PA-provable facts), is true, so we win.
Quite similarly, if a=b1, the game by now will be brought down to
(
|b|≤ |t|→ (|c|≤ |x|+ |b| ∧ c=x+b)
)
→
(
|b1|≤ |t|→⊔z(|z|≤ |x0|+ |b1| ∧ z=x0+b1)
)
.
Using Example 11.1, we compute the value d of c1, and specify z as d in the consequent. The resulting
position (
|b|≤ |t|→ (|c|≤ |x|+ |b| ∧ c=x+b)
)
→
(
|b1|≤ |t|→ |c1|≤ |x0|+ |b1| ∧ c1=x0+b1
)
,
in view of (10), is true, so we win.
The right inductive step will be handled in a similar way, only relying on (11) and (12) instead of (9)
and (10).
Fact 12.5 CLA4 ⊢ ⊔z(z=x×y).
Proof. The general scheme of proof here is very similar to the one employed in the proof of Fact 12.4,
and details are left as an exercise to the reader. Here we shall only point out that, the four basic PA-provable
facts that play the same role here as facts (9)-(12) in the proof of Fact 12.4 are the following:
s0×r0=(s×r)00, i.e., 2s×2r=4(s×r);
s0×r1=(s×r)00+s0, i.e., 2s×(2r+1)=4(s×r)+2s;
s1×r0=(s×r)00+r0, i.e., (2s+1)×2r=4(s×r)+2r;
s1×r1=(s×r)00+(s+r)1, i.e., (2s+1)×(2r+1)=4(s×r)+2(s+r)+1.
Also, where the previous proof relied on Axiom 9 and Example 11.1, the present proof, in addition, will rely
on Fact 12.4.
The following fact establishes the provable computability of all (polynomial) functions represented through
terms:
Fact 12.6 For any term τ (not containing z), CLA4 ⊢ ⊔z(z=τ).
Proof. We prove this fact by (meta)induction on the complexity of τ . The base cases are those of τ
being the constant 0 or a variable x. Both of the corresponding sentences ⊔z(z=0) and ⊓x⊔z(z=x) are
provable in CL12 and hence also in CLA4. Next, assume τ is θ ′. By the induction hypothesis, CLA4
proves ⊔z(z=θ). CLA4 also proves ⊔y(y=x ′) (Axiom 8). The desired ⊔z(z=θ ′) is a logical consequence
of these two. The remaining cases of τ being θ1+θ2 or θ1×θ2 are handled in a similar way, relying on Facts
12.4 and 12.5, respectively.
The formula of the following fact, as a computational problem, is about finding the (nonnegative) differ-
ence z between any two numbers x and y and then telling whether this difference is x−y or y−x.
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Fact 12.7 CLA4 ⊢ ⊔z(x=y+z ⊔ y=x+z).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on x, we want to show
⊓y
(
|y|≤ |t|→⊔z
(
|z|≤ |x|+ |y| ∧ (x=y+z ⊔ y=x+z)
))
. (15)
The basis |y|≤ |t|→⊔z
(
|z|≤ |0|+ |y| ∧ (0=y+z ⊔ y=0+z)
)
is obviously9 solved by the strategy that chooses
the value of y for the variable z and then selects the right ⊔ -disjunct.
To solve the left inductive step
⊓y
(
|y|≤ |t|→⊔z
(
|z|≤ |x|+ |y| ∧ (x=y+z ⊔ y=x+z)
))
→
⊓y
(
|y|≤ |t|→⊔z
(
|z|≤ |x0|+ |y| ∧ (x0=y+z ⊔ y=x0+z)
))
,
(16)
we wait till Environment specifies a constant a for y in the consequent. Then, using Fact 12.2, we compute
the binary predecessor b of a, and also figure out whether a = b0 or ( ⊔ ) a=b1.
Case 1: a=b0. We specify y as b in the antecedent of (16), this way forcing Environment to choose a
constant c for z there (unless |b|≤ |t| is false, in which case |a|≤ |t| is also false and we win), and also choose
one of the disjuncts of x=b+c ⊔ b=x+c. Using Axiom 9, we calculate the value d of c0, and specify z as d
in the consequent of (16). Further, if Environment has chosen x=b+c in the antecedent, we choose the left
⊔ -disjunct in the consequent. This means that, by now, (16) is brought down to
(|b|≤ |t|→ |c|≤ |x|+ |b| ∧ x=b+c)→ (|b0|≤t→ |c0|≤ |x0|+ |b0| ∧ x0=b0+c0).
From PA, the above is true, so we win. Similarly, if Environment has chosen b=x+c in the antecedent of
(16), then we choose the right ⊔ -disjunct in the consequent, and again win.
Case 2: a=b1. Again, we specify y as b in the antecedent of (16), this way forcing Environment to choose
a constant c for z there, and also to choose one of the disjuncts of x=b+c ⊔ b=x+c.
Subcase 2.1: b=x+c is chosen. Using Example 11.1, we calculate the value d of c1, specify z as d in the
consequent of (16), and choose the right ⊔ -disjunct there. By now, (16) is brought down to
(|b|≤ |t|→ |c|≤ |x|+ |b| ∧ b=x+c)→ (|b1|≤ |t|→ |c1|≤ |x0|+ |b1| ∧ b1=x0+c1).
According to PA, the above is true, so we win.
Subcase 2.2: x=b+c is chosen. First, using Example 11.3, we figure our whether c=0 or ( ⊔ ) c 6=0.
Subsubcase 2.2.1: c=0. Using Axiom 8, we calculate the value d of 0 ′, specify z as d in the consequent
of (16), and choose the right ⊔ -disjunct there. This means that, by now, (16) is brought down to
(|b|≤ |t|→ |0|≤ |x|+ |b| ∧ x=b+0)→ (|b1|≤ |t|→ |0 ′|≤ |x0|+ |b1| ∧ b1=x0+0 ′)
which, by PA, is true, so we win.
Subsubcase 2.2.2: c 6=0. Using Axiom 9 and Fact 12.3, we calculate d with c0=d ′, i.e. d=c0−1, specify
z as d in the consequent of (16), and choose the left ⊔ -disjunct there. This means that, by now, (16) is
brought down to the following true (by PA) position, so we win:
(|b|≤ |t|→ |c|≤ |x|+ |b| ∧ x=b+c)→
(
|b1|≤ |t|→ |c0−1|≤ |x0|+ |b1| ∧ x0=b1+(c0−1)
)
.
The right inductive step is handled in a rather similar way, and it is left as an exercise.
Thus, we have proven (15). Now, the target sentence ⊓x⊓y⊔z(x=y+z ⊔ y=x+z)
)
can be easily seen to
be a logical consequence of (15) and the PA-provable fact ∀y(|y|≤ |y|).
Fact 12.8 CLA4 ⊢ x=y ⊔ x 6=y.
9Here and often elsewhere implicitly relying on PA.
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Proof. Argue in CLA4. In order to solve x=y ⊔ x 6=y, using Fact 12.7, we find the difference a between
x and y. Further, using Example 11.3, we figure out whether a=0 or a 6=0. If a=0, we choose the left
⊔ -disjunct, otherwise we choose the right ⊔ -disjunct.
For natural numbers n and i — as always identified with the corresponding binary numerals — such
that i< |n|, in our metalanguage, we let [n]i mean bit #i of n, where the count of the bits of n starts from 0
rather than 1, and proceeds from left to right. So, for instance, if n = 100, then 1 is its bit #0, and the 0s
are its bits #1 and #2. We treat [n]i as a pseudoterm just like |x|, meaning that we can feel free to write
expressions such as [x]y =z, understood as abbreviations, in formulas of CLA4.
Fact 12.9 CLA4 ⊢ y< |x|→⊔z(z= [x]y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By induction on x, we want to show
⊓y
(
|y|≤ |x|→
(
y< |x|→⊔z(|z|≤0 ′ ∧ z= [x]y)
))
. (17)
The basis |y|≤ |0|→
(
y< |0|→⊔z(|z|≤0 ′ ∧ z= [0]y)
)
is obviously solved by a strategy that makes no moves.
To solve the left inductive step
⊓y
(
|y|≤ |x|→
(
y< |x|→⊔z(|z|≤0 ′ ∧ z= [x]y)
))
→⊓y
(
|y|≤ |x0|→
(
y< |x0|→⊔z(|z|≤0 ′ ∧ z= [x0]y)
))
,
we wait till Environment selects a value a for y in the consequent. Using Facts 12.1 and 12.8, we figure out
whether a= |x| or not. If yes, we select 0 for z in the consequent. If not, we choose a for y in the antecedent
and wait till Environment responds by selecting a constant b for z there, after which we choose the same
constant b for z in the consequent. With a little thought, this strategy can be seen to win.
The right inductive step has a similar strategy, with the difference that, if a= |x|, it chooses the value of
0 ′ (found using Axiom 8) for z in the consequent.
Now, the target y< |x|→⊔z(z=[x]y) can be seen to be a logical consequence of (17) and the PA-provable
fact ∀(y< |x|→ |y|≤ |x|).
The exponentiation function 2x increases the size of its argument exponentially and hence, in view of the
soundness of CLA4, cannot be provably computable. According to the following fact, however, the same is
not the case for a limited version of the function:
Fact 12.10 CLA4 proves both of the following:
x≤ |z|→⊔y(y=2x); (18)
⊔y(y=2|r|). (19)
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-induction on x, we want to prove x≤ |z|→⊔y(|y|≤ |z| ′ ∧ y=2x),
from which (18) immediately follows by LC.
The basis 0≤ |z|→⊔y(|y|≤ |z| ′ ∧ y=20) is obviously solved by choosing the value a of 0 ′ for y. Such an
a can be found using Axiom 8. The left inductive step is
(
x≤ |z|→⊔y(|y|≤ |z| ′ ∧ y=2x)
)
→
(
x0≤ |z|→⊔y(|y|≤ |z| ′ ∧ y=2x0)
)
.
To solve it, we wait till Environment chooses a value for y in the antecedent. If such a value is never
chosen, Environment loses unless x≤ |z| is false. But, if x≤ |z| is false, then so is x0≤ |z|, and we win.
So, assume a is the constant chosen by Environment in the antecedent for y. Using Fact 12.5, we com-
pute b with b=a2, and choose b for y in the consequent. We win because the game will have evolved to
(x≤ |z|→ |a|≤ |z| ′ ∧ a=2x)→ (x0≤ |z|→ |b|≤ |z| ′ ∧ b=2x0), i.e.
(x≤ |z|→ |a|≤ |z| ′ ∧ a=2x)→ (2x≤ |z|→ |a2|≤ |z| ′ ∧ a2=22x)
which, by PA, is true. The right inductive step is similar, with the difference that here we shall choose b to
be 2a2 rather than a2, computing which will take Axiom 9 in addition to Fact 12.5.
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Thus, (18) is proven. Now we solve (19), i.e. ⊔y(y=2|r|), as follows. First, using Fact 12.1, we find the
value a of |r|. Next, using (18) — namely, specifying its z and x as r and a, respectively — we compute the
value b with b=2a, i.e. b=2|r|, and choose that b for y in ⊔y(y=2|r|).
We generalize the earlier notation [x]y to [x]
z
y , additionally to y< |x| requiring that y+z≤ |x|. It means
“the substring of x of length z which starts at the yth bit”. For instance, if x=111010, then [x]32=101, [x]
6
0
=x
and, for each i ∈ {0, . . . , 5}, [x]0i =0. As always, we identify the bit string [x]
z
y with the number it represents
in the binary notation. Note that the old [x]y is the special case of [x]
z
y with z=1. The following fact states
the provable computability of the function [x]zy .
Fact 12.11 CLA4 ⊢ y< |x| ∧ y+z≤ |x|→⊔t(t= [x]zy).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. First, by CLA4-induction on r, we want to prove
y< |x| ∧ y+ |r|≤ |x|→⊔t(|t|≤ |x| ∧ t= [x]|r|y ). (20)
The basis y< |x| ∧ y+ |0|≤ |x|→⊔t(|t|≤ |x| ∧ t= [x]|0|y ) is solved straightforwardly by choosing 0 for t. That
is because 0 stands for the empty bit string, and so does [x]
|0|
y for whatever x, y with y< |x|.
The right inductive step is
(
y< |x| ∧ y+ |r|≤ |x|→⊔t(|t|≤ |x| ∧ t= [x]|r|y )
)
→
(
y< |x| ∧ y+ |r1|≤ |x|→⊔t(|t|≤ |x| ∧ t= [x]|r1|y )
)
. (21)
Assume y< |x| ∧ y+ |r1|≤ |x|. Then we also have y< |x| ∧ y+ |r|≤ |x|. Using the antecedental resource⊔t(|t|≤ |x|
∧ t= [x]
|r|
y ), we find a with |a|≤ |x| such that a= [x]
|r|
y . Using Facts 12.1, 12.4 and 12.9, we further find b with
b= [x]y+|r|. Now the sought value of t is the value of a0+b, which we compute using Axiom 9 and Fact 12.4.
To solve the left inductive step, first we figure out (using Example 11.3) whether r=0 or not. If r=0, we
ignore the antecedent and act in the consequent as the strategy for the basis of induction did. Otherwise,
we act as the strategy for the right inductive step did.
(20) is thus proven. To solve the target y< |x| ∧ y+z≤ |x|→⊔t(t= [x]zy), assume y< |x| ∧ y+z≤ |x|. Then
z≤ |x|. Using Facts 12.2 and 12.10, we find the value a of the binary predecessor of 2z. Note that |a|=z.
Now, using (20), we find the value b of [x]
|a|
y , i.e. of [x]zy. Selecting b for t solves the problem.
13 The soundness of CLA4
This section is devoted to proving the soundness part of Theorem 11.5. It means showing that any CLA4-
provable sentence X (as always, identified with its standard interpretation X†) has a polynomial time
solution, and that, furthermore, such a solution for X , together with an explicit polynomial bound τ for its
time complexity, can be efficiently extracted from any extended CLA4-proof of X . Consider any sentence
X with a fixed CLA4-proof.
For presentational considerations, by induction on the length of the proof of X , we will first simply show
that a polynomial time solution of X exists. Only after that, at the end of this section, we will show that
such a solution, together with an explicit polynomial bound for its time complexity, is or can be constructed
efficiently.
Assume X is an axiom of CLA4. If X is a Peano axiom, then it is a true elementary sentence and
therefore is won by a machine that makes no moves. If X is ⊓x⊔y(y=x ′) (Axiom 8), then it is won by a
machine that (for the constant x chosen by Environment for the variable x) computes the value a of x+1,
and makes a as its only move in the play. Similarly, if X is ⊓x⊔y(y=x0) (Axiom 9), it is won by a machine
that computes the value a of 2x, and makes a as its only move in the play. Needless to point out that all of
the above machines run in polynomial time.
Next, suppose X is obtained from premises Y1, . . . , Yn by LC. By the induction hypothesis, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we already have a solution (HPM) Ni of Yi together with an explicit polynomial bound ξi for
the time complexity of Ni. Of course, every such HPM Ni can as well be seen as an n-ary GHPM that simply
ignores its inputs. Then, by Theorem 10.1, we can (efficiently) construct an n-ary GHPMM, together with
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an explicit polynomial bound τ(ξ1, . . . , ξn) for the time complexity of the HPM M(pN1q, . . . , pNnq) such
that the latter solves X .
Finally, suppose X is (the ⊓-closure of) F (x), where F (x) is a polynomially bounded formula, and X
is obtained by CLA4-Induction on x. So, the premises are (the ⊓-closures of) F (0), F (x)→ F (x0) and
F (x)→ F (x1). By the induction hypothesis, there are HPMs N , K0,K1 — with explicit polynomial bounds
ξ, ζ0, ζ1 for their time complexities, respectively — that solve these three premises, respectively. Fix them.
We need certain auxiliary concepts. Consider any polynomially bounded formula H , any legal position
Φ of ⊓H , and any legal move α (by whichever player ℘) in position Φ. In this context, we say that α is
unreasonable if it signifies a choice of a constant c for a variable y in a ⊔y
(
S(y, ~z) ∧G
)
or ⊓y
(
S(y, ~z)→G
)
(depending on whether ℘ = ⊤ or ℘ = ⊥) subcomponent of H , such that c violates the conditions on its size
imposed by the sizebound S(y, z). Rather than trying to turn this otherwise clear intuitive explanation into a
strict definition, providing an example would be sufficient. Let H be the formula 0=0 ∧⊔y(|y|≤ |z| ′ ∧ z=y0).
Then the move 1.1111 is unreasonable in position 〈⊥11〉. That is because this move signifies choosing the
constant 1111 for y. And the move ⊥11 of the position has set the value of z to 11 and hence the value of
|z| to 2. So, the condition |y|≤ |z| ′, i.e. |1111|≤ |11| ′, is violated. Any other move 1.n with |n|>3, such as
1.1000 or 1.111111111, would also be unreasonable in that position.
We replace N by its “reasonable counterpart” N ′ — an HPM which never makes unreasonable moves
but otherwise is essentially the same as N . Namely, N ′ is a machine that works just like N , with the
difference that, every time N makes an unreasonable move that chooses some (offensively long) constant
c for a variable bound by a (bounded) quantifier of F (0), N ′ chooses (the always safe) 0 instead. Note
that this does not decrease the chances of the machine to win, as unreasonable moves always result in the
corresponding subgames’ being lost, anyway. Obviously N ′ can be efficiently constructed from N . Further,
the corresponding explicit polynomial bound ξ′ can also be efficiently indicated (the latter will depend on
ξ and the sizebounds of the ⊔-bound variables of F (0)). In a similar fashion, we replace K0,K1 by their
“reasonable counterparts” K′0,K
′
1 and the corresponding explicit polynomial bounds ζ
′
0, ζ
′
1 for their time
complexities. For simplicity, we further replace the three bounds ξ′, ζ′0, ζ
′
1 by the (generously taken) common
bound φ=ξ′+ζ′0+ζ
′
1 for the time complexities of all three machines N
′, K′0 and K
′
1.
We now describe an HPM M that solves the conclusion F (x). In this description, we use the term
“synchronizing” to mean applying copycat between two (sub)games of the form A and ¬A. This means
copying one player’s moves in A as the other player’s moves in ¬A, and vice versa. The effect achieved this
way is that the games to which A and ¬A eventually evolve (the final positions hit by them, that is) will be
of the form A′ and ¬A′, that is, one will remain the negation of the other, so that one will be won by a given
player iff the other is lost by the same player. Moderated synchronization means the same, with the only
difference that, whenever a player makes an unreasonable move by choosing an (offensively long) constant c
for a variable bound by a bounded quantifier, the move is copied by the synchronizer with c replaced by 0.
Throughout our description and analysis of the work of M, we assume that its adversary never makes
illegal moves, for otherwise M easily detects illegal behavior and retires with victory.
At the beginning, M waits for Environment to choose constants for the free variables of F (x). Assume
k is the length of the constant chosen for the variable x, and the bits of that constant, in the left-to-right
order, are b1, b2, . . . bk. We shall also assume here that k 6=0, for otherwise the case is straightforward. Let
d0 be the constant 0 and, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let di be the constant b1 . . . bi. So, the constant chosen
by Environment for x is dk. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let K′bi stand for K
′
0 if bi = 0, and for K
′
1 if bi = 1.
Similarly, let xbi stand for x0 if bi = 0, and for x1 if bi = 1.
After Environment chooses constants for all free variables of F (x), the work ofM consists in continuously
polling its run tape to see if Environment has made any new moves, combined with simulating, in parallel,
one play of ⊓
(
F (0)
)
by N ′ and — for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} — one play of ⊓
(
F (x)→ F (xbi)
)
by K′bi . In the
simulation of N ′, M lets the imaginary adversary of N ′ choose, at the very beginning of the play, the same
constants for the free variables of F (0) as M’s adversary chose for those variables in the real play. In the
simulation of each K′bi , M lets the imaginary adversary of K
′
bi
choose, at the very beginning of the play, the
constant di−1 for x and the same constants for all other free variables of F (x)→ F (xbi) as M’s adversary
chose for those variables in the real play.
Let F ′(x) be the result of substituting (see Definition 4.2) in F (x) each free variable of F (x) other than x
by the constant chosen by (the real) Environment for that variable. Thus, after Environment’s initial moves,
⊓
(
F (x)
)
has been brought down to F ′(dk). Similarly, after the initial moves by the imaginary adversary of
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N ′, ⊓
(
F (0)
)
will be brought down to F ′(0). And similarly, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, after the initial moves
by the imaginary adversary of K′bi , ⊓
(
F (x)→ F (xbi)
)
will be brought down to F ′(di−1)→ F
′(di).
What M does after the above initial moves in the real and simulated plays is that it synchronizes k+1
pairs of (sub)games, real or imaginary. Namely:
• It synchronizes — in the moderated sense — the consequent of the imaginary play of F ′(dk−1)→ F ′(dk)
by K′bk with the real play of F
′(dk).
• For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}, it synchronizes the consequent of the imaginary play of F ′(di−1)→ F ′(di)
by K′bi with the antecedent of the imaginary play of F
′(di)→ F
′(di+1) by K′bi+1 .
• It synchronizes the imaginary play of F ′(0) (i.e. of F ′(d0)) by N ′ with the antecedent of the imaginary
play of F ′(d0)→ F
′(d1) by K′b1 .
Below is an illustration of such synchronization arrangements — indicated by arcs — for the case
dk=d4=1001:
machine: status: game:
N ′ imaginary F ′(0)
K′1 imaginary F
′(0)→ F ′(1)
K′0 imaginary F
′(1)→ F ′(10)
K′0 imaginary F
′(10)→ F ′(100)
K′1 imaginary F
′(100)→ F ′(1001)
M real F ′(1001)
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
PP
PP
This completes our description ofM. Remembering our assumption that (N ,K0,K1 and hence)N ′,K′0,K
′
1
win the corresponding games, with a little thought it can be seen that M wins F ′(dk) and hence ⊓
(
F (x)
)
,
as desired. It now remains to show that the time complexity of M is also as desired.
Remembering that the machines N ′,K′0,K
′
1 are “reasonable” and that the synchronization between the
real play of F ′(dk) and the consequent of F
′(dk−1)→ F
′(dk) is moderated, one can easily write a term η(ℓ)
with a single variable ℓ such that, if ℓ is greater than or equal to the size of any of the constants chosen by
Environment for the free variables of F (x), the sizes of no moves ever made byM or the simulated N ′,K′0,K
′
1
exceed η(ℓ). For instance, if F (x) is ⊔u
(
|u|≤ |x|× |z| ∧⊓v(|v|≤ |u|+ |x|→G)
)
where G is elementary, then
η(ℓ) can be taken to be ℓ×ℓ+ℓ+0 ′ ′ ′ ′ (here 0 ′ ′ ′ ′ is to account for the size of the prefix “.”, “1.” or “0.1.”
that any legal move by ⊤ in any of the plays that we consider would take).
For the rest of this proof, pick and fix an arbitrary play (computation branch) of M, and an arbitrary
clock cycle c on which M makes a move α in the real play of F (x). Let ~ and ℓ be the timecost and the
background (see Section 7) of this move, respectively. Let d0, . . . , dk be as in the description of the work of
M. Note that ℓ is not smaller than the size of the greatest of the constants chosen by Environment for the
free variables of F (x). Hence, where η is as in the previous paragraph, we have:
The sizes of no moves ever made by M or the simulated N ′,K′0,K
′
1 exceed η(ℓ). (22)
The polling, simulation and copycat performed by M do impose some time overhead. But the latter
is only (fixed) polynomial and, in our subsequent analysis, can be safely ignored. Namely, for the sake of
simplicity, we are going to pretend that M copies moves in its copycat routine instantaneously (as soon as
detected), and that the times thatM ever spends “thinking” about what move to make are the times during
which it is waiting for simulated machines to make one or several moves. Furthermore, we will pretend that
the polling and the several simulations happen in a truly parallel fashion, in the sense that M spends a
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single clock cycle on tracing a single computation step of all k+1 machines simultaneously, as well as on
checking out its run tape to see if Environment has made a new move.
Let β1, . . . , βm be the moves by simulated machines thatM detects by time c, arranged according to the
times t1≤ . . . ≤tm of their detections (which, by our simplifying assumptions, coincide with the timestamps
of those moves in the corresponding simulated plays). Let d=c−~. Let j be the smallest integer among
1, . . . ,m such that tj ≥d. Since each simulated machine runs in time φ, in view of (22) it is clear that tj −d
does not exceed φ(η(ℓ)). Nor does ti−ti−1 for any i with j<i≤m. Therefore tm−d≤(m−j+1)×φ(η(ℓ)).
Since m, j≥1, let us be generous and simply say that tm−d≤m×φ(η(ℓ)). But notice that βm is a move
made by K′bk in the consequent of F
′(dk−1)→ F (dk), immediately (by our simplifying assumptions) copied
by M in the real play when it made its move α. In other words, c=tm. And c−d=~. So, ~ does not exceed
m×φ(η(ℓ)). And, by (22), the size of α does not exceed m×φ(η(ℓ)), either. But observe that k≤ℓ, and that
m cannot exceed k+1 times the depth (see Section 4) d of F (0); therefore, m≤d×(ℓ+1). Thus, (as long
as we pretend that there is no polling/simulation/copycat overhead) neither the timecost nor the size of α
exceed d×(ℓ+1)×φ(η(ℓ)).
An upper bound for the above function d×(ℓ+1)×φ(η(ℓ)), even after “correcting” the latter so as to
precisely account for the so far suppressed polling/simulation/copycat overhead, can be written as an explicit
polynomial function τ . The latter expresses the sought polynomial bound for the time complexity of M.
Thus, we have shown how to construct, from a proof of X , an HPM M and an explicit polynomial
function τ such that M solves X in time τ . Obviously our construction is effective. It remains to see that
it also is — or, at least, can be made — efficient. Of course, at every step of our inductive construction
(for each sentence of the proof, that is), the solution M of the step and its time complexity bound τ is
obtained efficiently from previously constructed Ms and τs. This, however, does not guarantee that the
entire construction will be efficient as well. For instance, if the proof has n steps and the size of each HPM
M that we construct for each step is twice the size of the previously constructed HPMs, then the size of the
eventual HPM will exceed 2n and thus the construction will not be efficient, even if each of the n steps of it
is so.
A trick that we can use to avoid an exponential growth of the sizes of the machines that we construct
and thus achieve the efficiency of the entire construction is to deal with GHPMs instead of HPMs. Namely,
assume the proof of X is the sequence X1, . . . , Xn of sentences, with X = Xn. LetM1, . . . ,Mn be the HPMs
constructed as we constructed Ms earlier at the corresponding steps of our induction. Remember that each
suchMi was defined in terms ofMj1 , . . . ,Mjk for some j1, . . . , jk < i. For simplicity and uniformity, we may
just as well say that eachMi was defined in terms of allM1, . . . ,Mn, with thoseMjs that were not among
Mj1 , . . . ,Mjk simply ignored in the description of the work of Mi. Now, for each such Mi, let M
′
i be the
n-ary GHPM whose description is obtained from that of Mi by replacing each reference to (any previously
constructed) Mj by “M′j(pM
′
1q, . . . , pM
′
nq) where, for each e ∈ {1, . . . , n}, M
′
e is the machine encoded
by the eth input”.10 As it is easy to see by induction on i, Mi and M′i(pM
′
1q, . . . , pM
′
nq) are essentially
the same, in the sense that our earlier analysis of the play and time complexity of the former applies to the
latter just as well. So, M′n(pM
′
1q, . . . , pM
′
nq) wins Xn, i.e. X . At the same time, note that the size of each
GHPM M′i is independent of the sizes of the other (previously constructed) GHPMs. Based on this fact,
with some analysis, one can see that then the HPMM′n(pM
′
1q, . . . , pM
′
nq) is indeed constructed efficiently.
As for the explicit polynomial bounds τ1, . . . , τn for the time complexities of the nHPMsM′1(pM
′
1q, . . . , pM
′
nq),
. . . , M′n(pM
′
1q, . . . , pM
′
nq), their sizes can be easily seen to be polynomial in the size of the proof. That
is because, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the size of τi only increases the sizes of the earlier constructed τjs by
adding (rather than multiplying by) a certain polynomial quantity.11 Thus, the explicit bound τn for the
time complexity of the eventual HPM M′n(pM1q, . . . , pMnq) is indeed constructed efficiently.
14 The extensional completeness of CLA4
This section is devoted to proving the completeness part of Theorem 11.5. It means showing that, for any
arithmetical problem A that has a polynomial time solution, there is a theorem of CLA4 which, under the
10For simplicity, here we assume that every number is a code of some n-ary GHPM; alternatively,M′
i
can be defined so that
it does nothing if any of its relevant inputs is not the code of some n-ary GHPM.
11The fact that we represent complexity bounds as explicit polynomial functions rather than polynomial tree-terms or even
graph-terms is relevant here.
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standard interpretation, equals (“expresses”) A.
14.1 X, X and χ
So, let us pick an arbitrary polynomial-time-solvable arithmetical problem A. By definition, A is an arith-
metical problem because, for some sentence X of the language of CLA4, A = X†. For the rest of this
section, we fix such a sentence X, and fix X as an HPM that solves A (and hence X†) in polynomial time.
Specifically, we assume that X runs in time χ, where χ, which we also fix for the rest of this section, is a
single-variable term of the language of PA— and hence can as well be seen/written as an explicit polynomial
function — with χ(x)≥x for all x. For readability, we also agree that, throughout the rest of this section,
“formula” exclusively means a subformula of X , in which some variables may be renamed.
X may not necessarily be provable in CLA4, and our goal is to construct another sentence X for which,
just like for X , we have A = X
†
and which, perhaps unlike X , is provable in CLA4.
Remember our convention about identifying formulas of the language of CLA4 with (the games that
are) their standard interpretations. So, in the sequel, just as we have done so far, we shall typically write
E,F, . . . to mean either E,F, . . . or E†, F †, . . .. Similar conventions apply to terms as well. In fact, we have
already used this convention when saying that X runs in time χ. What was really meant was that it runs in
time χ†.
14.2 Preliminary insights
Our proof is a little long and, in the process of going through it, it is easy to get lost in the forest and stop
seeing it for the trees. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to try to get some preliminary insights into the
basic idea behind this proof before venturing into its details.
Let us consider the simplest nontrivial special case where X is
⊓x
(
Y (x) ⊔Z(x)
)
for some elementary formulas Y (x) and Z(x) (perhaps Z(x) is ¬Y (x), in which case X expresses an ordinary
decision problem — the problem of deciding the predicate Y (x)).
The assertion “X does not win X in time χ” can be formalized in the language of PA through as a
certain sentence L. Then we let the earlier mentioned X be the sentence
⊓x
((
Y (x) ∨ L
)
⊔
(
Z(x) ∨ L
))
.
Since X does win the game X in time χ, L is false. Hence Y (x) ∨ L is equivalent to Y (x), and Z(x) ∨ L is
equivalent to Z(x). This means that X and X , as games, are the same, that is, X
†
= X†. It now remains
to understand why CLA4 ⊢ X.
A central lemma here is one establishing that the work of X is “provably traceable”. Roughly, in our
present case this means the provability of the fact that, for any (⊓) value chosen for x by Environment —
let us continue referring to that value as x — we can tell (⊔) the configuration of X in the corresponding
play of X at any given time t. Letting X work for χ(x) steps, one of the following four eventual scenarios
should take place, and the provable traceability of the work of X can be shown to imply that CLA4 proves
the ⊔ -disjunction of sentences describing those scenarios:
Scenario 1: X makes the move 0 (and no other moves).
Scenario 2: X makes the move 1 (and no other moves).
Scenario 3: X does not make any moves.
Scenario 4: X makes an illegal move (perhaps after first making a legal move 0 or 1).
In the case of Scenario 1, the play over X hits Y (x) ∨ L. And CLA4 — in fact, PA — proves that, in
this case, Y (x) ∨ L is true. The truth of Y (x) ∨ L is indeed very easily established: if it was false, then Y (x)
should be false, but then the play of X overX hits the false Y (x) and hence is lost, but then L is true, but then
36
Y (x) ∨ L is true. Thus, CLA4 ⊢ (Scenario 1)→ Y (x) ∨ L, from which, by LC, CLA4 ⊢ (Scenario 1)→X.
The case of Scenario 2 is symmetric.
In the case of Scenario 3, (CLA4 proves that) X loses, i.e. L is true, and hence, say, Y (x) ∨L (or
Z(x) ∨ L if you like) is true. That is, CLA4 ⊢ (Scenario 3)→ Y (x) ∨L, from which, by LC, CLA4 ⊢
(Scenario 3)→X. The case of Scenario 4 is similar.
Thus, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, CLA4 ⊢ (Scenario i)→X. And, as mentioned, we also have
CLA4 ⊢ (Scenario 1) ⊔ (Scenario 2) ⊔ (Scenario 3) ⊔ (Scenario 4).
The desired CLA4 ⊢ X follows from the above provabilities by LC.
The above was about the pathologically simple case of X = ⊓x
(
Y (x) ⊔Z(x)
)
, and the general case will
be much more complex, of course. Among other things, showing the provability of X would require a certain
metainduction on its complexity, which we did not need in the present case. But the idea that we have
just tried to explain would still remain valid and central, only requiring certain — nontrivial yet doable —
adjustments and refinements.
14.3 The sentence L
By a literal we mean ⊤, ⊥, or an atomic formula with or without negation ¬. By a politeral of a formula
we mean a positive (not in the scope of ¬) occurrence of a literal in it. For instance, the occurrence of p,
as well as of ¬q (but not q), is a politeral of p ∧ ¬q. While a politeral is not merely a literal but a literal L
together with a fixed occurrence, we shall often refer to it just by the name L of the literal, assuming that
it is clear from the context which (positive) occurrence of L is meant.
We assume that the reader is sufficiently familiar with Go¨del’s technique of encoding and arithmetizing.
Using that technique, we can construct a sentence L of the language of PA which asserts “X does not win
X in time χ”. Namely, let E1(~x), . . . , En(~x) be all subformulas of X , where all free variables of each Ei(~x)
are among ~x (but not necessarily vice versa). Then L is the ∨ -disjunction of natural formalizations of the
following statements:
1. There is a ⊤-illegal position of X spelled on the run tape of X on some clock cycle of some
computation branch of X .
2. There is a clock cycle c in some computation branch of X on which X makes a move whose
timecost exceeds χ(ℓ), where ℓ is the background of c.
3. There is a (finite) legal run Γ of X generated by X and a tuple ~c of constants (~c of the same
length as ~x) such that:
• 〈Γ〉X = E1(~c), and we have ¬‖E1(~c)‖ (i.e., ‖E1(~c)‖ is false),
• or . . ., or
• 〈Γ〉X = En(~c), and we have ¬‖En(~c)‖ (i.e., ‖En(~c)‖ is false).
14.4 The overline notation
As we remember, our goal is to construct a formula X which expresses the same problem as X does and
which is provable in CLA4. For any formula E — including X — we let E be the result of replacing in E
every politeral L by L ∨ L.
Lemma 14.1 Any literal L is equivalent (in the standard model of arithmetic) to L ∨ L.
Proof. That L implies L ∨ L is immediate, as the former is a disjunct of the latter. For the opposite
direction, suppose L ∨ L is true at a given valuation e. Its second disjunct cannot be true, because X does
win X in time χ, contrary to what L asserts. So, the first disjunct, i.e. L, is true.
Lemma 14.2 For any formula E, including X, we have E† = E
†
.
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Proof. Immediately from Lemma 14.1 by induction on the complexity of E.
In view of the above lemma, what now remains to do for the completion of our completeness proof is to
show that CLA4 ⊢ X. The rest of the present section is entirely devoted to this task.
Lemma 14.3 For any formula E, CLA4 ⊢ L→ ∀E.
Proof. Induction on the complexity of E. The base, which is about the cases where E is a literal,
is straightforward, as then L is a disjunct of E. If E has the form H0 ∧H1, H0 ∨H1, H0 ⊓H1 or H0 ⊔H1
then, by the induction hypothesis, CLA4 proves L→ ∀H0 and L→ ∀H1, from which L→ ∀E follows by
LC. Similarly, if E has the form ∀xH(x), ∃xH(x), ⊓xH(x) or ⊔xH(x), then, by the induction hypothesis,
CLA4 proves L→ ∀H(x), from which L→ ∀E follows by LC.
14.5 The single-circle and double-circle notations
The way we encode configurations through natural numbers will be precisely described later in Section A.1.
For now, it would be sufficient to say that the size of the code of a configuration is always greater than the
background (see Section 7) of the corresponding clock cycle in the corresponding play. For readability, we
will often identify configurations with their codes and say something like “a is a configuration” when what
is precisely meant is “a is the code of a configuration”.
By a legitimate configuration we shall mean a configuration of X that might have occurred in some
computation branch B of X such that the run spelled by B is a legal run of X . The yield of such a
configuration is the game 〈Φ〉X , where Φ is the position spelled on the run tape in that configuration.
By a deterministic successor of a legitimate configuration x we mean the configuration y such that y
immediately follows x (in one transition) in the scenario where Environment does not move during the cycle
described by x. For n ≥ 0, the nth deterministic successor of x is defined inductively by stipulating that
the 0th deterministic successor of x is x, and the (n+1)th deterministic successor of x is the deterministic
successor of the nth deterministic successor of x.
Let E(~s) be a formula all of whose free variables are among ~s (but not necessarily vice versa), and z be
a variable not among ~s. We will write E◦(z, ~s) to denote an elementary formula whose free variables are z
and those of E(~s), and which is a natural arithmetization of the predicate that, for any constants a,~c in the
roles of z, ~s, holds (that is, E◦(a,~c) is true) iff a is a legitimate configuration and its yield is E(~c). Further,
we will write E◦◦(z, ~s) to denote an elementary formula whose free variables are z and those of E(~s), and
which is a natural arithmetization of the predicate that, for any constants a,~c in the roles of z, ~s, holds iff
E◦(a,~c) ∧E◦(b,~c) is true, where b is the χ(|a|)th deterministic successor of a.
We say that a formula E is critical iff one of the following conditions is satisfied:
• E is of the form G0 ⊔G1 or ⊔yG;
• E is of the form ∀yG or ∃yG, and G is critical;
• E is of the form G0 ∨G1, and both G0 and G1 are critical;
• E is of the form G0 ∧G1, and at least one of G0, G1 is critical.
Lemma 14.4 Assume E(~s) is a non-critical formula all of whose free variables are among ~s. Then
PA ⊢ ∀
(
E◦◦(z, ~s)→ ‖E(~s)‖
)
.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Argue in PA. Consider arbitrary (∀) values of z and ~s,
which we continue writing as z and ~s. Suppose, for a contradiction, that E◦◦(z, ~s) is true but ‖E(~s)‖ is false.
The falsity of ‖E(~s)‖ implies the falsity of ‖E(~s)‖. This is so because the only difference between the two
formulas is that, wherever the latter has some politeral L, the former has a ∨ -disjunction containing L as
a disjunct.
The truth of E◦◦(z, ~s) implies that X reaches the configuration (computation step) z and, in the scenario
where Environment does not move, X does not move either for at least χ(|z|) steps afterwards. If X does
not move even after χ(|z|) steps, then it has lost the game, because the eventual position hit by the latter
is E(~s) and the elementarization of the latter is false (it is not hard to see that every such game is indeed
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lost). And if X does make a move sometime after χ(|z|) steps, then it violates its time complexity bound χ,
because the background of that move is smaller than |z| but the timecost is at least χ(|z|). Thus, in either
case, X does not win X in time χ, that is,
L is true. (23)
Consider any non-critical formula G. By induction on the complexity of G, we are going to show that
‖G‖ is true for any (∀) values of its free variables. Indeed:
If G is a literal, then ‖G‖ is G ∨ L which, by (23), is true.
If G is H0 ⊓H1 or ⊓xH(x), then ‖G‖ is ⊤ and is thus true.
G cannot be H0 ⊔H1 or ⊔xH(x), because then it would be critical.
If G is ∀yH(y) or ∃yH(y), then ‖G‖ is ∀y‖H(y)‖ or ∃y‖H(y)‖. In either case ‖G‖ is true because, by
the induction hypothesis, ‖H(y)‖ is true for every value of its free variables, including variable y.
If G is H0 ∧H1, then both H0 and H1 are non-critical. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, both ‖H0‖
and ‖H1‖ are true. Hence so is ‖H0‖ ∧ ‖H1‖ which, in turn, is nothing but ‖G‖.
Finally, if G is H0 ∨H1, then one of the formulas Hi is non-critical. Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
‖Hi‖ is true. Hence so is ‖H0‖ ∨ ‖H1‖ which, in turn, is nothing but ‖G‖.
Thus, for any non-critical formula G, ‖G‖ is true. This includes the case G = E(~s) which, however,
contradicts our assumption that ‖E(~s)‖ is false.
Lemma 14.5 Assume E(~s) is a critical formula all of whose free variables are among ~s. Then
CLA4 ⊢ ∃E◦◦(z, ~s)→ ∀E(~s). (24)
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. By induction on complexity, one can easily see that
the elementarization of any critical formula is false. Thus, for whatever (∀) values of ~s, ‖E(~s)‖ is false.
Arguing further as we did in the proof of Lemma 14.4 when deriving (23), we find that, if E◦◦(z, ~s) is true
for whatever (∃) values of z and ~s, then so is L. And this argument can be formalized in PA, so that we
have PA ⊢ ∃E◦◦(z, ~s)→ L. This, together with Lemma 14.3, can be easily seen to imply (24) by LC.
14.6 Q.E.D.
In this subsection we finish the extensional completeness proof for CLA4. Well, almost finish. The point is
that our argument relies on Lemma 14.6 whose proof is postponed to Appendix A. Here we only present a
brief intuitive explanation of the proof idea for it. A reader satisfied by our explanation will have no reasons
to go through the technical appendix given at the end of this paper, whose only purpose is to provide a
relatively detailed proof for Lemma 14.6.
Let E be a formula not containing the variable y. We say that a formula H is a (⊥, y)-development of
E iff H is the result of replacing in E:
• either a surface occurrence of a subformula F0 ⊓ F1 by Fi (i = 0 or i = 1),
• or a surface occurrence of a subformula ⊓xF (x) by F (y).
(⊤, y)-development is defined in the same way, only with ⊔ ,⊔ instead of ⊓ ,⊓.
Lemma 14.6 Assume E(~s) is a formula all of whose free variables are among ~s, and y is a variable not
occurring in E(~s). Then:
(a) For every (⊥, y)-development Hi(y,~s) of E(~s), CLA4 proves E◦◦(z, ~s)→⊔uH◦i (u, y, ~s).
(b) Where H1(y,~s), . . . , Hn(y,~s) are all of the (⊤, y)-developments of E(~s), CLA4 proves
E◦(z, ~s)→E◦◦(z, ~s) ⊔L ⊔⊔u⊔yH
◦
1 (u, y, ~s) ⊔ . . . ⊔⊔u⊔yH
◦
n(u, y, ~s). (25)
Proof idea. E◦(z, ~s) implies that z is a configuration reached by X in some play, and the game by
that time has been brought down to E(~s). E◦◦(z, ~s) additionally implies that this situation persists “for a
while” after z.
For clause (a), assume E◦◦(z, ~s). For any (⊥, y)-development Hi(y,~s) of E(~s) and any value of y, Hi(y,~s)
is the game to which E(~s) is brought down by a certain labmove ⊥α. To solve ⊔uH◦i (u, y, ~s) — i.e., make
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H◦i (u, y, ~s) true — we can choose u to be the result of appending such a labmove ⊥α to the run tape content
of the deterministic successor of configuration z. After properly formalizing encoding for configurations, this
argument can be reproduced in CLA4.
For clause (b), assume E◦(z, ~s). We can trace, within CLA4, the work of X for “sufficiently many” —
namely, χ(|z|) — steps in the scenario where Environment does not move. If X does not move during those
χ(|z|) steps either, then E◦◦(z, ~s) is true and we can choose it in the consequent of (25). Suppose now X makes
a move α within χ(|z|) steps. If α is illegal, then L is true, and we choose the latter in the consequent of (25).
Otherwise, if α is a legal move, then it brings E(~s) down to one of (the instances of) its (⊤, y)-developments
Hi(y,~s) for a certain value of y. We choose the corresponding ⊔ -disjunct in the consequent of (25); further,
by tracing the work of X , we will be able to compute the value of the configuration u in which X made the
above move, as well the above-mentioned “certain value of y”. By choosing these values for the variables u
and y in ⊔u⊔yH◦1 (u, y, ~s), we win the game. Again, after properly formalizing encoding for configurations,
the entire argument can be reproduced in CLA4.
Lemma 14.7 Assume E(~s) is a formula all of whose free variables are among ~s. Then CLA4 proves
E◦(z, ~s)→E(~s).
Proof. We prove this lemma by (meta)induction on the complexity of E(~s). By the induction hypoth-
esis, for any (⊥, y)- or (⊤, y)-development Hi(y,~s) of E(~s) (if there are any), CLA4 proves
H◦i (u, y, ~s)→Hi(y,~s). (26)
Argue in CLA4 to justify E◦(z, ~s)→E(~s). Consider any values (constants) b and ~a chosen by Environ-
ment for z and ~s, respectively.12 Assume E◦(b,~a) is true (if not, we win). Our goal is to show how to win
E(~a). From clause (b) of Lemma 14.6, the resource (25) with b,~a plugged for z, ~s is at our disposal. Since
the antecedent of the latter is true, the provider of (25) will have to choose one of the ⊔ -disjuncts in the
consequent
E◦◦(b,~a) ⊔ L ⊔⊔u⊔yH
◦
1 (u, y,~a) ⊔ . . . ⊔⊔u⊔yH
◦
n(u, y,~a). (27)
Case 1: L is chosen in (27). It has to be true, or else the provider loses. By Lemma 14.3, we also have
the resource L→ ∀E(~s). Since its antecedent L is true, we know how to win the consequent ∀E(~s). But a
strategy that wins the latter, of course, also wins our target E(~a).
Case 2: One of ⊔u⊔yH◦i (u, y,~a) is chosen in (27). This should be followed by a further choice of some
constants c and d for u and y, yielding H◦i (c, d,~a). Plugging ~a, c and d for ~s, u and y in (26), we get
H◦i (c, d,~a)→Hi(d,~a). We may assume that the antecedent of the latter is true, or else the provider of (27)
lied when bringing the latter down to H◦i (c, d,~a). Thus, the consequental resource Hi(d,~a) is at our disposal.
But, remembering that the formula Hi(y,~s) is a (⊤, y)-development of the formula E(~s), we can now win
E(~a) by making a move α that brings the latter down to Hi(d,~a), which we already know how to win. For
example, imagine E(~s) is Y (~s)→Z(~s) ⊔ T (~s) andHi(y,~s) is Y (~s)→ Z(~s), so that E(~a) is Y (~a)→Z(~a) ⊔ T (~a)
andHi(d,~a) is Y (~a)→ Z(~a). Then the above move α will be “1.0”. It indeed brings Y (~a)→ Z(~a) ⊔ T (~a) down
to Y (~a)→Z(~a). As another example, imagine E(~s) is Y (~s)→⊔wZ(w,~s) and Hi(y,~s) is Y (~s)→Z(y,~s), so
that E(~a) is Y (~a)→⊔wZ(w,~a) and Hi(d,~a) is Y (~a)→ Z(d,~a). Then the above move α will be “1.d”. It
indeed brings Y (~a)→⊔wZ(w,~a) down to Y (~a)→ Z(d,~a).
Case 3: E◦◦(b,~a) is chosen in (27). It has to be true, or else the provider loses.
Subcase 3.1: The formula E(~s) is critical. Since E◦◦(b,~a) is true, so is ∃E
◦
◦(z, ~s). By Lemma 14.5, we also
have ∃E◦◦(z, ~s)→ ∀E(~s). So, we have a strategy that wins ∀E(~s). Of course, the same strategy also wins
E(~a).
Subcase 3.2: The formula E(~s) is not critical. By Lemma 14.4, we find that the elementarization of
E(~a) is true. This obviously means that if Environment does not move in E(~a), we win the latter. So,
assume Environment makes a move α in E(~a). The move should be legal, or else we win. Of course,
the same move is a legal move of E(~a) and, for one of the (⊥, y)-developments Hi(y,~s) of the formula
E(~s) and some constant c, it brings E(~a) down to Hi(c,~a) as well as E(~a) down to Hi(c,~a). For exam-
ple, if E(~s) is Y (~s)→Z(~s) ⊓ T (~s), α could be the move “1.0”, which brings Y (~a)→Z(~a) ⊓ T (~a) down to
Y (~a)→Z(~a); the formula Y (~s)→Z(~s) is indeed a (⊥, y)-development of the formula Y (~s)→ Z(~s) ⊓ T (~s).
12Here, unlike the earlier followed practice, for safety, we are reluctant to use the names z and ~s for those constants.
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As another example, imagine E(~s) is Y (~s)→⊓wZ(w,~s). Then the above move α could be “1.c”, which brings
Y (~a)→⊓wZ(w,~a) down to Y (~a)→Z(c,~a); the formula Y (~s)→ Z(y,~s) is indeed a (⊥, y)-development of the
formula Y (~s)→⊓wZ(w,~s). Fix the above formula Hi(y,~s) and constant c. Choosing b, ~a and c for z, ~s and
y in the resource provided by clause (a) of Lemma 14.6, we get the resource E◦◦(b,~a)→⊔uH◦i (u, c,~a). Since
the antecedent of the latter is true by our assumptions, the consequent ⊔uH◦i (u, c,~a) is at our disposal. The
provider will have to choose a constant d for u in it such that H◦i (d, c,~a) is true. Hence, by choosing d, c
and ~a for u, y and ~s in (26), we get the resource Hi(c,~a). That is, we have a strategy for the game Hi(c,~a)
to which E(~a) has evolved after Environment’s move α. We switch to that strategy and win.
Now we are ready to claim the target result of this section. Let a be the code of the start configuration
of X , and aˆ be a standard variable-free term representing a, such as 0 followed by a “ ′”s. Of course, PA
and hence CLA4 proves X◦(aˆ). By Fact 12.6, CLA4 proves ⊔z(z= aˆ). By Lemma 14.7, CLA4 also proves
⊓z
(
X◦(z)→X
)
. These three can be seen to imply X by LC. Thus, CLA4 ⊢ X , as desired.
15 Inherent extensional incompleteness in the general case
The extensional completeness ofCLA4 is not a result that could be taken for granted. In this short section we
argue that, if one replaces polynomial time computability by simply computability in our semantical treatment
of CLA4, extensional completeness is impossible to achieve for whatever recursively axiomatizable sound
extension of CLA4 or other systems of clarithmetic.
Our extensional incompleteness argument goes like this. Consider any system S in the style of CLA4
whose proof predicate — throughout this section understood in the “superextended” sense of Section 11 —
is decidable and hence the theoremhood predicate is recursively enumerable. Assume S is sound in the same
strong sense as CLA4— that is, there is an effective procedure that extracts an algorithmic solution (HPM)
for the problem represented by any sentence F from any S-proof of F .
Let then A(s) be the predicate which is true iff:
• s is (the code of) an S-proof of some sentence of the form ⊓x
(
¬E(x) ⊔E(x)
)
, where E is elementary,
• and E(s) is false.
On our assumption of the soundness of S, A(s) is a decidable predicate. Namely, it is decided by a
procedure that first checks if s is the code of an S-proof of some sentence of the form ⊓x
(
¬E(x) ⊔E(x)
)
,
where E is elementary. If not, it rejects. If yes, the procedure extracts from s an HPM H which solves
⊓x
(
¬E(x) ⊔E(x)
)
, and then simulates the play of H in the scenario where, at the very beginning of the
play, Environments makes the move s, thus bringing the game down to ¬E(s) ⊔E(s). If, in this play, H
responds by choosing ¬E(s), then the procedure accepts s; and if H responds by choosing E(s), then the
procedure rejects s. Obviously this procedure indeed decides the predicate A.
Now, assume that S is extensionally complete. Since A is decidable, the problem ⊓x
(
¬A(x) ⊔A(x)
)
has
an algorithmic solution. So, for some sentence F with F † = ⊓x
(
¬A(x) ⊔A(x)
)
and some c, we should have
that c is (the code of) an S-proof of F . Obviously F should have the form ⊓x
(
¬E(x) ⊔E(x)
)
, where E(x)
is an elementary formula with E†(x) = A(x). We are now dealing with the absurd of A(c) being true iff it
is false.
16 On the intensional strength of CLA4
Theorem 16.1 Let X and L be as in Section 14. Then CLA4 ⊢ ¬L→X.
Proof. Let X and L be as in Section 14, and so be the meaning of the overline notation. First, by
induction on the complexity of E, we want to show that
For any formula E, CLA4 ⊢ ∀(E ∧ ¬L→E). (28)
If E is a literal, then ∀(X ∧ ¬L→E) is nothing but ∀
(
(E ∨L) ∧ ¬L→E
)
. This is a classically valid elemen-
tary sentence, and hence it is provable in CLA4 (by LC from the empty set of premises). Next, suppose E
41
is F0 ∧ F1. By the induction hypothesis, CLA4 proves both ∀(F0 ∧ ¬L→ F0) and ∀(F1 ∧ ¬L→ F1). These
two, by LC, imply ∀
(
(F0 ∧ F1) ∧ ¬L→ F0 ∧ F1
)
. And the latter is nothing but the desired ∀(E ∧ ¬L→E).
The remaining cases where E is F0 ∨F1, F0 ⊓ F1, F0 ⊔ F1, ⊓xF (x), ⊔xF (x), ∀xF (x) or ∃xF (x) are handled
in a similar way. (28) is thus proven.
(28) implies that CLA4 proves X ∧ ¬L→X . As established in Section 14, CLA4 also proves X. From
these two, by LC, CLA4 proves ¬L→X , as desired.
Remember that, in Section 14, X was an arbitrary CLA4-sentence assumed to have a polynomial time
solution under the standard interpretation †. And ¬L was a certain true sentence of the language of classical
Peano arithmetic. We showed in that section that CLA4 proved a certain sentence X with X
†
= X†. That
is, we showed that X was “extensionally provable”. According to our present Theorem 16.1, in order to make
X also provable in the intensional sense, all we need is to add to the axioms of CLA4 the true elementary
sentence ¬L.
In philosophical terms, the import of Theorem 16.1 is that the culprit of the intensional incompleteness
of CLA4 is the (Go¨del’s) incompleteness of its classical, elementary part. Otherwise, the “nonelementary
rest” of CLA4 — the two extra-Peano axioms and the CLA4-Induction rule — as a bridge from classical
arithmetic to polynomial-time-computability-oriented clarithmetic, is complete in a certain very strong and
natural sense. Namely, it guarantees not only extensional but also intensional provability of every polynomial
time computable problem as long as all necessary true elementary sentences are taken care of. This means
that if, instead of PA, we take the truth arithmetic Th(N) (the set of all true sentences of the language
of PA) as the base arithmetical theory, the corresponding version of CLA4 will be not only extension-
ally, but also intensionally complete. Unfortunately, however, such a system will no longer be recursively
axiomatizable.
To summarize, in order to make CLA4 intensionally stronger, it would be sufficient to add to it new
true elementary (classical) sentences only. Note that this sort of an extension, even if in a language more
expressive than that of PA, would automatically remain sound and extensionally complete: virtually nothing
in this paper relies on the fact that PA is not stronger than it really is. Thus, basing applied theories on CoL
allows us to construct ever more expressive and intensionally strong theories without worrying about how
to preserve soundness and extensional completeness. Among the main goals of this paper was to illustrate
the scalability of CoL rather than the virtues of the particular system CLA4 based on it. The latter is
in a sense arbitrary, as is PA itself: in the role of the classical part of CLA4, we could have chosen not
only any true extension of PA, but certain weaker-than-PA theories as well, for our proof of the extensional
completeness of CLA4 does not require the full strength of PA. The reason for not having done so is purely
“pedagogical”: PA is the simplest and best known arithmetical theory, and reasoning in it is much more
relaxed, easy and safe than in weaker versions. CLA4 is thus the simplest and nicest representative of
the wide class of clarithmetical theories for polynomial time computability, all enjoying the same relevant
properties as CLA4 does.
As pointed out in Section 1, among the potential applications of CLA4-style systems is using them as
formal tools (say, after developing reasonable theorem-provers) for systematically finding efficient solutions
for problems, and the stronger such a system is, the better the chances that a solution for a given problem
will be found. Of course, what matters in this context is intensional rather than extensional strength. So,
perfect strength is not achievable, but we can keep moving ever closer to it.
One may ask why not think of simply using PA (or even, say, ZFC) instead of CLA4 for the same
purposes: after all, PA is strong enough to allow us reason about polynomial time computability. This is
true, but PA is far from being a reasonable alternative to CLA4. First of all, as a tool for finding solutions,
PA is very indirect and hence hopelessly inefficient. Pick any of the basic functions of Section 12 and try
to generate, in PA, a full formal proof of the fact that the function is polynomial-time computable (or even
just express this fact) to understand the difference. Such a proof would have to proceed by clumsy reasoning
about non-number objects such as Turing machines and computations, which, only by good luck, happen to
be amenable to being understood as numbers through encoding. In contrast, reasoning in CLA4 is directly
about numbers and their properties, without having to encode any foreign (metaarithmetical or complexity-
theoretical) beasts and then try to reason about them as if they were just kind and innocent natural numbers.
Secondly, even if an unimaginably strong theorem-prover succeeded in finding such a proof, there would be
no direct use of it because, from a proof of the existence of a solution we cannot directly extract a solution.
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Furthermore, even knowing that a given HPM X solves the problem in some polynomial time χ, would have
no practical significance without knowing what particular polynomial χ is, in order to assess whether it is
reasonable for our purposes, or takes us beyond the number of nanoseconds in the lifespan of the universe
(after all, ℓ999
999
is also a polynomial function!). In order to actually obtain a solution and a polynomial
bound for it, one would need a constructive proof, that is, not just a proof that a polynomial function χ
and a χ-time solution exist, but a proof of the fact that certain particular numbers a and b are (the codes
of) a polynomial term χ and a χ-time solution X . Otherwise, a theorem-prover would have to be used not
just once for a single target formula, but an indefinite (intractably many) number of times, once per each
possible pair of values of a, b until the “right” values are encountered. To summarize, PA does not provide
any reasonable mechanism for handling queries in the style “find a polynomial time solution for problem A”:
in its standard form, PA is merely a YES/NO kind of a “device”.
The above dark picture can be somewhat brightened by switching from PA to Heyting’s arithmetic
HA — the version of PA based on intuitionistic logic instead of classical logic, which is known to allow
us to directly extract, from a proof of a formula ∃xF (x), a particular value of x for which F (x) is true.
But the question is why intuitionistic logic and not CoL? Both claim to be “constructive logics”, but the
constructivistic claims of CoL have a clear semantical meaning and justification, while intuitionistic logic
is essentially an ad hoc invention whose constructivistic claims are mainly based on certain syntactic and
hence circular considerations,13 without being supported by a convincing and complete formal constructive
semantics. And, while HA is immune to the second one of the two problems pointed out in the previous
paragraph, it still suffers from the first problem. At the same time, as a reasoning tool,HA is inferior to PA,
for it is intensionally weaker and, from the point of view of the philosophy of CoL, is so for no good reasons.
As a simple example, consider the function f defined by “f(x) = x if PA is either consistent or inconsistent,
and f(x) = 2x otherwise”. This is a legitimately defined function, and we all — just as PA — know that
extensionally it is the same as the identity function f(x) = x. Yet, HA can be seen to fail to prove — in the
intensional sense — its computability. Despite its name, intuitionistic logic is not so “intuitive” after all!
A natural question to ask is: Is there a sentence X of the language of CLA4 whose polynomial time
computability is constructively provable in PA yet X is not provable in CLA4? Remember that, as we
agreed just a while ago, by constructive provability of the polynomial time computability of X in PA
we mean that, for some particular HPM X and a particular polynomial (term) χ, PA proves that X is a
χ-time solution of X . If the answer to this question was positive, then PA, while indirect and inefficient,
would still have at least something to say in its defense when competing with CLA4 as a problem-solving
tool. But, as seen from the following theorem, the answer to the question is negative:
Theorem 16.2 Let X be any sentence of the language of CLA4 such that PA constructively proves (in the
above sense) the polynomial time computability of X. Then CLA4 ⊢ X.
Proof. Consider any sentence X of the language of CLA4. Assume PA constructively proves the
polynomial time computability of X , meaning that, for a certain HPM X and a certain term χ, PA proves
that X solves X in time χ. But this is exactly what the sentence L of Section 14 denies. So, PA ⊢ ¬L. But,
by Theorem 16.1, we also have CLA4 ⊢ ¬L→X . Consequently, CLA4 ⊢ X .
An import of the above theorem is that, if we tried to add to CLA4 some new nonelementary axioms in
order to achieve a properly greater intensional strength, the fact that such axioms are computable in time
χ for some particular polynomial χ would have to be unprovable in PA, and hence would have to be “very
nontrivial”. The same applies to attempts to extend CLA4 through some new rules of inference.
17 Give Caesar what belongs to Caesar
Beginning from Buss’s seminal work [6], many complexity-sensitive or complexity-oriented arithmetical and
logical systems have been developed by various authors ([3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 33, 35] and more). Most of those
13What creates circularity is the common-sense fact that syntax is merely to serve a meaningful semantics, rather than vice
versa. It is hard not to remember the following words from [26] here: “The reason for the failure of P ⊔ ¬P in CoL is not that
this principle . . . is not included in its axioms. Rather, the failure of this principle is exactly the reason why this principle, or
anything else entailing it, would not be among the axioms of a sound system for CoL”.
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achieve control over complexity in ways very different from ours, such as by type information rather than by
explicit bounds on quantifiers, for which reason we do not attempt any direct comparison here. As pointed
out in Section 1, Buss’s [6] original work on bounded arithmetic is closest to — and the most immediate
precursor of — our approach. In fact, in a broad sense, CLA4 is a system of bounded arithmetic, only based
on CoL instead of classical logic or intuitionistic logic on which the other systems of bounded arithmetic
have been traditionally based.
The main relevant results in the studies of classical-logic-based bounded arithmetic, extensive surveys of
which can be found in [11, 32], can be summarized saying that, by appropriately weakening the induction
axiom of PA and restricting it to bounded formulas of certain forms, and correspondingly readjusting the
nonlogical vocabulary and axioms of PA, certain soundness and completeness for the resulting system(s) S
can be achieved. Such soundness results typically read like “If S proves a formula of the form ∀x∃yF (x, y),
where F satisfies such and such constraints, then there is function of such and such computational complexity
which, for each a, returns a b with F (a, b)”. And completeness results typically read like “For any function
f of such and such computational complexity, there is an S-provable formula of the form ∀x∃yF (x, y) such
that, for any a and b, F (a, b) is true iff b = f(a)”.
Among the characteristics that make our approach very different from the above (as well as any other
complexity-oriented systems of arithmetic known to the author), one should point out that it extends rather
than restricts the language and the deductive power of PA. Restricting PA can be seen as throwing out the
baby with the bath water. Not only does it expel from the system many complexity-theoretically unsound
yet otherwise meaningful and useful theorems, but it also reduces — even if only in the intensional rather
than extensional sense — the class of complexity-theoretically correct provable principles. This is a necessary
sacrifice, related to the inability of the underlying classical logic to clearly differentiate between constructive
( ⊓ , ⊔ ,⊓,⊔) and “ordinary”, non-constructive versions ( ∧ , ∨ , ∀, ∃) of operators. The inadequacy of classi-
cal logic as a basis for constructive systems also shows itself in the fact that the above-mentioned soundness
and completeness results are only partial.
The above problem of partiality is partially overcome when one bases a complexity-oriented arithmetic
on intuitionistic logic ([7, 35]) instead of classical logic. In this case, soundness/completeness extends to all
formulas of the form ∀x∃yF (x, y), without the “F satisfies such and such constraints” condition (the reason
why we still consider this sort of soundness/completeness partial is that it remains limited to formulas of the
form ∀x∃yF (x, y), i.e. functions, which, for us, are only special cases of computational problems). However,
for reasons pointed out in the previous section, switching to intuitionistic logic signifies throwing out even
more of the “baby” from the bath tub, further decreasing the intensional strength of the theory and probably
losing its intuitive clarity or appeal in the eyes of the classically-minded majority.
Both classical-logic-based and intuitionistic-logic-based systems of bounded arithmetic happen to be
inherently weak theories, as opposed to our CoL-based version, which is as strong as Go¨del’s incompleteness
phenomenon permits, and which can be indefinitely strengthened without losing computational soundness.
We owe this achievement to the fact that CoL gives Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and God what belongs to
God. As we had a chance to see throughout this paper, classical ( ∧ , ∨ , ∀, ∃) and constructive ( ⊓ , ⊔ ,⊓,⊔)
logical constructs can peacefully coexist and complement each other in one natural system that seamlessly
extends the classical, constructive, resource- and complexity-conscious visions and concepts, and does so
not by mechanically putting things together, but rather on the basis of one natural, all-unifying, complete
game semantics. Unlike most other approaches where only few, special-form expressions (if any) have clear
computational interpretations, in our case every formula is a meaningful computational problem. Further,
we can capture not only computational problems in the traditional sense, but also problems in the more
general — interactive — sense.
Classical logic and classical arithmetic, so close (unlike, say, intuitionistic logic or HA) to the heart and
mind of all of us, do not at all need to be rejected or tampered with in order to achieve constructive heights.
Just the opposite, they can be put in faithful and useful service to this noble goal. Our heavy reliance on
reasoning in PA throughout this paper is an eloquent illustration of it. Overall, the present work can be seen
as an illustration of the fruitfulness of two independently conceived lines of thought — bounded arithmetic
and computability logic — through a successful marriage between them.
The forthcoming paper [30] constructs three new, incrementally strong systems of clarithmetic, named
CLA5, CLA6 and CLA7. In the same sense as CLA4 is sound and complete with respect to polynomial
time computability, these systems are shown to be sound and complete with respect to polynomial space
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computability, elementary recursive time computability and primitive recursive time computability, respec-
tively (as for elementary recursive space and primitive recursive space, they simply coincide with elementary
recursive time and primitive recursive time). The simplicity and elegance of those systems serves as addi-
tional empirical evidence for the naturalness of basing applied theories on CoL instead of the more traditional
alternatives, and for the flexibility and scalability of our approach. All three systems, on top of Axioms 1-7,
have Axiom 8 as the only extra-Peano axiom (Axiom 9 simply becomes derivable and hence redundant due
to the presence of a stronger induction rule). CL12 continues to serve as the logical basis for these systems,
and what varies is only the induction rule. The induction rule of CLA5 differs from that of CLA4 in that,
while the (two) inductive steps of the latter are based on binary successors, the (single) inductive step of
the former is based on unary successor, i.e., is the kind old F (x)→ F (x ′), with F (x) still required to be a
polynomially bounded formula. The system CLA6 is obtained from CLA5 by relaxing this requirement in
the induction rule and, instead, requiring that F (x) be exponentially bounded. And the system CLA7 is
obtained from CLA6 by removing all conditions on F (x) whatsoever, thus leaving the realm of bounded
arithmetic.
The earlier mentioned system CLA1 of [27] further strengthens the above series. Its logical basis, just
like that of all clarithmetical theories we have seen, is CL12. And the nonlogical axioms, just as in the case
of CLA5, CLA6 and CLA7, are Axioms 1-8 of Section 11. As we may guess, the only difference between
CLA1 and the weaker systems CLA4-CLA7 is (again) related to how the induction rule operates. Here
the difference is of a qualitative character due to the fact that CLA1, unlike CLA4-CLA7, is a natural
deduction system. Namely, while an inductive step of CLA7 is a formula F (x)→ F (x ′), the corresponding
inductive step in CLA1 is a derivation of F (x ′) from F (x). In classical systems, according to the deduction
theorem, a formula E is derivable from a formula G iff the formula G→ F is provable, so switching to natural
deduction in the style of CLA1 would create no difference. The situation, however, is very different in (the
resource-conscious) CoL-based systems, where deriving E from G is generally easier than proving G→E.
This is so because a derivation may “recycle” its premises while, on the other hand, the antecedent of a → -
combination may be “unrecyclable”. For instance, E ∧E is always derivable from E but, as we had a chance
to see from Exercise 9.5, E→E ∧E is not always provable (and/or valid). While derivability of F (x ′) from
F (x) thus does not generally imply provability of F (x)→ F (x ′), the latter does always imply the former.
Consequently, CLA1 is at least as strong as CLA7, meaning that CLA1, just like CLA7, can extensionally
prove all primitive recursive time (and/or space) computable problems. A natural expectation here is that,
at the same time, CLA1 takes us “far beyond” primitive recursive time (and/or space) computability, even
though exactly how far still remains to be understood.
A Appendix
Throughout the rest of this appendix, the sole purpose of which is to prove Lemma 14.6, X , X and χ are
as in Section 14. The terms “configuration”, “state”, “tape symbol” etc. exclusively refer to ones of X . We
assume that 0 and 1 are among the tape symbols. blank will stand for the blank tape symbol.
The proofs given in this appendix will heavily and repeatedly rely on PA and the results of Section 12.
It is important to note that, almost always, this reliance will be only implicit.
A.1 Encoding configurations
In order to prove Lemma 14.6, we need to introduce a system of encoding for various objects of relevance.
Whenever O is such an object, pOq will stand for its code.
Let A be the set consisting of all states (of X ), and four versions aˆ, aˇ, aˆ, aˇ of every tape symbol a. As
opposed to tape symbols, we refer to the elements of A (simply) as symbols. As we are going to see shortly,
in our encoding of configurations, aˆ (resp. aˇ) means the tape symbol a written on the work (resp. run) tape,
and the presence (resp. absence) of an underline indicates that the head of the corresponding tape is (resp.
is not) currently looking at the cell containing a.
We extend the ,ˆˇnotation from tape symbols to strings of tape symbols. Namely, for any such string α,
αˆ means the result of replacing every symbol a by aˆ in α. Similarly for αˇ.
We pick and fix a sufficiently large integer k and, with K standing for 2k throughout the rest of this paper,
encode each symbol a as a natural number paq with |paq| = K. As practiced earlier, terminologically and
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notationally we identify such an paq with the corresponding binary numeral. Thus, the codes of symbols
are bit strings, all of length K and none starting with a 0. Needless to mention that different symbols are
required to have different codes.
Further, where a1, . . . , ak is a sequence of symbols, we encode it as the binary numeral — again, identified
with the corresponding number — pa1q . . . pakq. We will not always be careful about differentiating objects
from their codes, and may say something like “the symbol b” where, strictly speaking, the code of that
symbol is meant, or vice versa.
We need to make clear what, exactly, is meant by a configuration. According to our earlier informal
explanation, this is a full description of some “current” situation in X , namely, a list indicating the state
of X , the locations of its two scanning heads, and the contents of its two tapes. The tapes, however, are
infinite, and we need to agree on how to represent their contents by finite means. Remember our convention
that a head of an HPM can never move past the leftmost blank cell of the corresponding tape, and that
the work-tape head can never write the blank symbol. This means that every cell to the left of a blank
cell will also be blank and, accordingly, when describing a configuration, it would be sufficient to describe
the contents of its tapes up to (including) the leftmost blank cells. Precisely, we agree to understand each
configuration C as the following sequence of symbols:
a, bˆ0, . . . bˆi−1, bˆi, bˆi+1, . . . , bˆm, cˇ0, . . . cˇj−1, cˇj , cˇj+1, . . . cˇn (29)
where, in the context of C, a is the (“current”) state of X , b0 . . . bm (resp. c0 . . . cn) are the contents of cells
#0 through #m (resp. #n) of the work (resp. run) tape, and i (resp. j) is the cell # of the cell scanned by
the head of the work (resp. run) tape. In addition, both bm = cn = blank while no other bk or ck is blank.
We encode the above configuration as any other sequence of symbols, i.e., as the binary numeral
paq pbˆ0q . . . pbˆi−1q pbˆiq pbˆi+1q . . . pbˆmq pcˇ0q . . . pcˇj−1q pcˇjq pcˇj+1q . . . pcˇnq.
In the sequel, we will be using the pseudoterm x ◦ y and several elementary formulas with special names,
each one being a natural arithmetization of the corresponding predicate shown below:
• x ◦ y abbreviates x×2|y|+y. Note that, when x and y are the codes of some sequences a1, . . . , am and
b1, . . . , bn of symbols, x ◦ y is the code of the concatenation a1, . . . , am, b1, . . . , bn of those sequences.
• N(x, y) says “if x is pbˆ1, . . . , bˆkq for some symbols b1, . . . , bk (k ≥ 0), then y is pbˇ1, . . . , bˇkq .” So, for
instance, D(p1ˆ, .ˆ, 0ˆq, p1ˇ, .ˇ, 0ˇq) is true.
• C(x) says “x is the code of a configuration”.
• I(x, y) says “x is the code of a configuration of the form (29), and i=y”.
• J(x, y) says “x is the code of a configuration of the form (29), and j=y”.
• M(x, y) says “x is the code of a configuration of the form (29), and m=y”.
• E(x, y) says “y is the code of the sequence of symbols resulting from changing every 0 to 0ˇ and every
1 to 1ˇ in the binary numeral representing number x”. So, for instance, E(101, p1ˇ, 0ˇ, 1ˇq) is true.
• D(x, y) says “x is pbˆ1, . . . , bˆkq for some bits b1, . . . , bk (k ≥ 0) where b1 (if present) is 1, and y is the
number represented by the numeral b1 . . . bk”. So, for instance, D(p1ˆ, 0ˆ, 1ˆq, 101) is true.
• S(x, y) says “x is the code of a configuration and y is the code of the deterministic successor (see
Section 14.5) of that configuration”.
• A(z, x, y) says “z is the code of a legitimate configuration C (see Section 14.5), x is the code of the yth
deterministic successor of C, and, for any i with 0≤i≤y, the state of the ith deterministic successor of C
is not a move state”. A(z, x, y) thus asserts that, after the (legitimate) configuration z, if Environment
does not move, X reaches the configuration x within y (y≥0) steps, and it does not move during those
steps, either.
• A′(z, y) abbreviates ∃xA(z, x, y). A′(z, y) thus says that, after reaching the (legitimate) configuration
z, during the subsequent y (including 0) steps, if Environment does not move, neither does X .
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• B(z, x) says “z is the code of a legitimate configuration C, x is the code of the ith deterministic
successor of C for some i≥0 and, for each j with 0≤j≤ i, the state of the jth deterministic successor of
C is a move state iff j= i”. B(z, x) thus asserts that z is a legitimate configuration and x is the earliest
configuration after (and including) z in which X moves in the scenario where Environment does not
move.
Lemma A.1 CLA4 ⊢ ⊔z(z=x ◦ y).
Proof. Immediate in view of the results of Section 12.
In the sequel, whenever we write K within a formula or while reasoning in CLA4, it is to be understood
as a standard variable-free term representing it. For clarity, let us say that this term is 0 followed by K ′s.
We shall implicitly rely on the fact that CLA4 ⊢ ⊔z(z=K) (Fact 12.6). Similarly for k, as well as pbq where
b is a symbol.
Lemma A.2 CLA4 ⊢ ⊔yN(x, y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on z, we first want to show
K× |z|≤ |x|→⊔y
(
|y|≤ |x| ∧N([x]
K×|z|
0 , y)
)
. (30)
The base K× |0|≤ |x|→⊔y
(
|y|≤ |x| ∧N([x]
K×|0|
0 , y)
)
is solved by choosing 0 (the code of the empty sequence
of symbols) for y. The left inductive step is
(
K× |z|≤ |x|→⊔y
(
|y|≤ |x| ∧N([x]
K×|z|
0 , y)
))
→
(
K× |z0|≤ |x|→⊔y
(
|y|≤ |x| ∧N([x]
K×|z0|
0 , y)
))
.
To solve it, we first figure our whether z=0 or z 6=0. If z=0, we ignore the antecedent and do in the consequent
the same as what we did in the base case. Otherwise, if z 6=0, we wait till Environment chooses a constant
a for y in the antecedent. Then we compute the value b of [x]K|z|×K (remember Fact 12.11). If b is pcˆq for
some symbol c (which can be established by using Fact 12.8 as many times as the number of symbols), then,
using Lemma A.1, we compute a ◦ pcˇq and choose the computed value for y in the consequent. Otherwise it
does not matter what we choose for y, so choose 0. The right inductive step is similar but simpler, as we do
not need to give the case z=0 a special consideration. Thus, (30) is proven.
Remember that K=2k. Let a be the kth binary predecessor of |x|, that is, we have |x| = ab1 . . . bk, where
each bi is either 0 or 1. Such an a can be found by first computing the value of |x| and then, starting
from that value, repeatedly computing binary successor (the constant) k times. Let b be the value of the
binary predecessor of 2a. Note that |b|=a. Plugging b for z in (30), we make this resource compute a value
c for which N([x]
K×|b|
0 , c), i.e. N([x]
K×a
0 , c), is true. Now notice that, if x is indeed the code of a sequence of
symbols, a is the number of symbols in that sequence and, as the length of the code of each symbol is K, we
have K×a= |x|; hence, we also have [x]K×a0 =x; hence, as N([x]
K×a
0 , c) is true, so is N(x, c). This means that
we win the target ⊔yN(x, y) by choosing c for y.
Lemma A.3 CLA4 proves each of the following:
1. C(x)→⊔yI(x, y).
2. C(x)→⊔yJ(x, y).
3. C(x)→⊔yM(x, y).
Proof. Here we only prove clause 1 of the lemma. The remaining clauses are similar.
Argue in CLA4. Let I′(x, z) be (a natural formalization of) the predicate “x is the code of a configuration
of the form (29), and z<i”. By CLA4-Induction on z, we want to prove
C(x)→ I′(x, |z|) ⊔⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ I(x, y)
)
. (31)
The basis is C(x)→ I′(x, |0|) ⊔⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ I(x, y)
)
. We find [x]K
K
. If the latter is aˆ for some tape symbol
a, we choose the right ⊔ -disjunct in the consequent and then choose 0 for y. Otherwise we choose the left
disjunct.
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The left inductive step is
(
C(x)→ I′(x, |z|) ⊔⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ I(x, y)
)
→
(
C(x)→ I′(x, |z0|) ⊔⊔y(|y|≤ |x| ∧ I(x, y)
)
. (32)
To solve it, we wait till Environment chooses a ⊔ -disjunct in the antecedent. If the left disjunct is chosen,
we find [x]K|z0|×K. If the latter is aˆ for some tape symbol a, we choose the right ⊔ -disjunct in the consequent
of (32), and specify y as the value of |z0|; otherwise we choose the left ⊔ -disjunct there. Suppose now the
right disjunct is chosen by Environment in the antecedent of (32). We further wait till a constant c is chosen
for y there. Then we choose the right ⊔ -disjunct in the consequent of (32), and specify y as c in it. The
right inductive step is virtually the same. It is not hard to see that our strategy is successful.
Now, the target C(x)→⊔yI(x, y) can be seen to be a logical consequence of (31), the PA-provable fact
∀x∀z
(
z= |x|→¬I′(x, z)
)
and the CLA4-provable sentence ⊓x⊔z(z=|x|).
Lemma A.4 CLA4 ⊢ ⊔yE(x, y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on x, we want to show ⊔y
(
|y|≤K× |x| ∧ E(x, y)
)
, from
which the target ⊔yE(x, y) immediately follows by LC.
The base ⊔y
(
|y|≤K× |0| ∧ E(0, y)
)
is solved by choosing 0 (the code of the empty sequence of symbols)
for y. For the left inductive step
⊔y
(
|y|≤K× |x| ∧ E(x, y)
)
→⊔y
(
|y|≤K× |x0| ∧ E(x0, y)
)
,
we first figure out whether x=0 or not. If yes, we ignore the antecedent and act in the consequent in the same
way as in the basis case. Otherwise, we wait till Environment chooses a constant a for y in the antecedent.
Then, using Lemma A.1, we compute the value b of a ◦ p0ˇq and choose b for y in the consequent. The right
inductive step is similar, with the difference that b should be the value of a ◦ p1ˇq there; also, the case of x=0
does not require a special handling.
Lemma A.5 CLA4 ⊢ ¬∃yD(x, y) ⊔⊔yD(x, y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on z, we want to show that
K× |z|≤ |x|→¬∃yD([x]
K×|z|
0 , y) ⊔⊔yD([x]
K×|z|
0 , y). (33)
The basis K× |0|≤ |x|→¬∃yD([x]
K×|0|
0 , y) ⊔⊔yD([x]
K×|0|
0 , y) is obviously solved by choosing the right ⊔ -
disjunct and specifying y as 0 in it.
The left inductive step is
(
K× |z|≤ |x|→¬∃yD([x]
K×|z|
0 , y) ⊔⊔yD([x]
K×|z|
0 , y)
)
→
(
K× |z0|≤ |x|→¬∃yD([x]
K×|z0|
0 , y) ⊔⊔yD([x]
K×|z0|
0 , y)
)
.
It is solved as follows. If z=0, we do in the consequent the same as in the basis case. Suppose now z 6=0. We
wait till Environment selects a ⊔ -disjunct in the antecedent (if there is no such selection, we win). If the
left disjunct is selected there, we also select the left disjunct in the consequent and rest our case. Suppose
now Environment selects the right disjunct. We wait till it further selects a constant a for y there. Then
we compute the value b of [x]K
K×|z|. If b=p0ˆq, we select the right ⊔ -disjunct in the consequent, compute the
value c of a0, and specify y as c there. If b=p1ˆq, we again select the right ⊔ -disjunct in the consequent,
compute the value c of a1, and specify y as c there. Finally, if neither b=p0ˆq nor b=p1ˆq, we select the left
disjunct and retire in victory. The right inductive step is the same, with the only difference that the case
z=0 does not require a special handling there. Obviously our strategy wins, and (33) is thus proven.
Now, to solve the target ¬∃yD(x, y) ⊔⊔yD(x, y), we use a trick similar to the one employed in the proof
of Lemma A.2. Namely, we compute the value a of the kth binary predecessor of |x|, and then the value b
of the binary predecessor of 2a. Note that |b|=a. Taking into account that K×a≤ |x|, by plugging b for z in
(33), we essentially turn this resource into
¬∃yD([x]K×a0 , y) ⊔⊔yD([x]
K×a
0 , y).
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This way we would either know that ¬∃yD([x]K×a0 , y) is true, or find a constant c for which (we know that)
D([x]K×a0 , c) is true. Note that if x is the code of a sequence of symbols, then K×a is nothing but |x| and
hence [x]K×a0 is nothing but x. With this observation in mind, if ¬∃yD([x]
K×a
0 , y) is true, then choosing the
left disjunct of ¬∃yD(x, y) ⊔⊔yD(x, y) wins this game; and, if D([x]K×a0 , c) is true, then choosing the right
disjunct and specifying y as c in it wins the game.
Lemma A.6 CLA4 ⊢ C(x)→⊔yS(x, y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4 to justify C(x)→⊔yS(x, y). Assume that C(x) is true, namely, that x is (the
code of) the configuration (29).
We find the state a of x, which is nothing but [x]K0 . Next, using clauses 1 and 2 of Lemma A.3, we
find the locations i and j of the two scanning heads. Then, using these i and j, we find the symbols b and
c seen by the two heads. This allows us to find (within PA) the state d of the deterministic successor y
of x, the symbol e that will overwrite the old symbol b on the work tape, and the directions in which the
heads move. We now correspondingly update x in several steps. First of all, we change the state of x to d.
Technically, this is done by computing pdq ◦ [x]
|x|−K
K
. In a similar fashion, details of which are left to the
reader, we change the old underlined symbol of the work tape to e, and move the two underlines according to
the directions in which the corresponding heads move. In addition, if a is a move state, we find the content
of the work tape of the original configuration x up to the location of the work-tape head, and append that
content, ⊤-prefixed and with each symbol sˆ changed to sˇ using Lemma A.2, to the content of the run tape
of x. Finally, if the previously blank cell #m of the work tape is no longer blank, we insert a blank cell to
the right of it in our representation of the configuration (again, technical details about how, exactly, all this
can be done, are left as an easy exercise for the reader). The eventual value of x, after the above updates,
will be exactly the sought value of the deterministic successor of the original x, that is, the value that we
should choose for y in the consequent of C(x)→⊔yS(x, y).
Lemma A.7 CLA4 ⊢ C(z)→A′(z, |r|) ⊔⊔xB(z, x).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on r, we want to prove
C(z)→⊔x
(
|x|≤ |z|+ |r| ∧A(z, x, |r|)
)
⊔⊔x
(
|x|≤(|z|+ |r|)0 ∧B(z, x)
)
,
from which the target C(z)→A′(z, |r|) ⊔⊔xB(z, x) easily follows by LC.
To solve the base C(z)→⊔x
(
|x|≤ |z|+ |0| ∧A(z, x, |0|)
)
⊔⊔x
(
|x|≤(|z|+ |0|)0 ∧ B(z, x)
)
, we figure out whether
the state of z is a move state or not. If yes, we choose the right ⊔ -disjunct; if not, we choose the left ⊔ -
disjunct. In either case, we further choose the value of z for the variable x and win.
The left inductive step is
(
C(z)→⊔x
(
|x|≤ |z|+ |r| ∧A(z, x, |r|)
)
⊔⊔x
(
|x|≤(|z|+ |r|)0 ∧ B(z, x)
))
→(
C(z)→⊔x
(
|x|≤ |z|+ |r0| ∧A(z, x, |r0|)
)
⊔⊔x
(
|x|≤(|z|+ |r0|)0 ∧ B(z, x)
))
.
(34)
If r=0, (34) is won by solving its consequent in the same ways as the basis case was solved. Suppose now
r 6=0. To solve (34), we wait till Environment selects one of the two ⊔ -disjuncts in the antecedent.
If the right ⊔ -disjunct is selected, we wait further till a constant c for x is selected there. Then we select
the right ⊔ -disjunct in the consequent, and choose the same c for x in it.
Suppose now the left ⊔ -disjunct is selected in the antecedent of (34). Wait further till a constant c for
x is selected there. We may assume that A(z, c, |r|) is true, or else we win the game. Using Lemma A.6, we
find the deterministic successor d of the configuration c. With a little thought, one can see that the size of
d cannot exceed the sum of the sizes of z and r0 more than twice, so that |d|≤(|z|+ |r0|)0 holds. We figure
out whether the state of d is a move state or not. If not, we select the left ⊔ -disjunct in the consequent of
(34), otherwise, select the right disjunct. In either case, we further choose d for x and win.
The right inductive step is virtually the same, with the only difference that the case z=0 does not require
a special handling.
49
A.2 Proof of clause (a) of Lemma 14.6
Assume the conditions of clause (a) of Lemma 14.6.
First, let us consider the case where Hi(y,~s) is the result of replacing in E(~s) a surface occurrence of a
subformula F0 ⊓ F1 by Fj (j=0 or j=1). Let ⊥α be the labmove that brings E(~s) down to Hi(y,~s). For
instance, if E(~s) is G→ F0 ⊓ F1 and Hi(y,~s) is G→ F0, then ⊥α is “⊥1.0”.
Argue in CLA4 to justify E◦◦(z, ~s)→⊔uH◦i (u, y, ~s). Assume E◦◦ (z, ~s). This implies that z is a legitimate
configuration with yield E(~s), and that the same holds for the deterministic successor b of z, which we
compute using Lemma A.6. Then the result of appending ⊥α to the run tape contents of (the configuration
encoded by) b is a legitimate configuration with yield Hi(y,~s). The code of such a configuration is b ◦ p⊥ˇαˇq.
We compute the value c of the latter using Lemma A.1, and win E◦◦(z, ~s)→⊔uH◦i (u, y, ~s) by choosing c for
u.
Next, consider the case where Hi(y,~s) is the result of replacing in E(~s) a surface occurrence of a sub-
formula ⊓xF (x) by F (y). Let α be the string such that, for any constant c, the labmove ⊥αc brings E(~s)
down to Hi(c, ~s). For instance, if E(~s) is G→⊓xF (x) ∨ J and Hi(y,~s) is G→ F (y) ∨ J , then α is “1.0.”;
and if E(~s) is just ⊓xF (x), then α is the empty string.
Argue in CLA4 to justify E◦◦(z, ~s)→⊔uH◦i (u, y, ~s). Let c be the value satisfying E(y, c). We compute
the latter using Lemma A.4. Assume E◦◦(z, ~s). This implies that z is a legitimate configuration with yield
E(~s). Then the same holds for the deterministic successor b of z, which we compute using Lemma A.6. Then
the result of appending ⊥αy to the run tape contents of (the configuration encoded by) b is a legitimate
configuration with yield H(y,~s). The code of such a configuration is b ◦ p⊥ˇαˇq ◦ c. We compute the value d
of the latter using Lemma A.1, and win E◦◦(z, ~s)→⊔uH◦i (u, y, ~s) by choosing d for u.
A.3 Proof of clause (b) of Lemma 14.6
Assume the conditions of clause (b) of Lemma 14.6. In CLA4, we can solve (25) as follows. Assume E◦(z, ~s),
which, of course, implies C(z). We compute the value of the binary predecessor of 2χ(|z|), and use that value
to specify r in the resource of Lemma A.7. As a result, we get the resource A′
(
z, χ(|z|)
)
⊔⊔xB(z, x). This
means that we will either know that A′
(
z, χ(|z|)
)
is true, or find a constant a for which we will know that
B(z, a) is true.
If A′
(
z, χ(|z|)
)
is true, then so is E◦◦(z, ~s) and, by choosing the latter, we win (25).
Now, for the rest of this proof, suppose B(z, a) is true. Using clause 3 of Lemma A.3, we find the number
i with I(a, i). Then we find (the code of) the move α that X made in a. Namely, pαˆq= [a]K×i
K
. Using Lemma
A.6, we also find the deterministic successor b of a. Fix these α and b.
Let β1, . . . , βm be all legal moves in position E(~s) that signify a choice of one of the two ⊔ -disjuncts in
some surface subformula F0 ⊔ F1 ofE(~s). LetH1(y,~s), . . . , Hm(y,~s) be the corresponding (⊥, y)-developments
of E(~s).
Further, let βm+1, . . . , βn be all strings such that, any move signifying a choice of a constant c for x in some
surface subformula ⊓xF (x) of E(~s) looks like βic for some i ∈ {m+1, . . . , n}. Let Hm+1(y,~s), . . . , Hn(y,~s)
be the corresponding (⊥, y)-developments of E(~s).
To solve (25), we need to solve its consequent, which now can be rewritten as follows:
E◦◦(z, ~s) ⊔L ⊔⊔u⊔yH◦1 (u, y, ~s) ⊔ . . . ⊔⊔u⊔yH◦m(u, y, ~s) ⊔
⊔u⊔yH◦m+1(u, y, ~s) ⊔ . . . ⊔⊔u⊔yH◦n(u, y, ~s).
(35)
This is how we solve (35). First, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we compare pαˆq with pβˆiq. If they turn out
to be the same, then we choose the disjunct ⊔u⊔yH◦i (u, y, ~s) in (35), and specify u and y as b and 0 in it,
respectively. Here our choice of 0 for y is arbitrary and has no effect on the game, as H◦i (u, y, ~s) does not
contain the variable y, anyway.
Otherwise, for each i ∈ {m+1, . . . , n}, we compare [pαˆq]ri0 with pβˆiq, where ri is the size of pβˆiq. If
they turn out to be the same, then, we figure out the (code of the) “rest” γ of the string α. That is, γ is
the string such that α = βiγ. Employing Lemma A.5, we either find a number c with D(pγˆq, c), or ( ⊔ ) find
out that such a c does not exist (¬∃). In the former case, we choose the disjunct ⊔u⊔yH◦i (u, y, ~s) in (35)
and specify u and y as b and c in it, respectively. In the latter case, α is an illegal move, so we choose L,
which is true because X , having made an illegal move, loses.
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Otherwise, α is simply an illegal move, so we (again) choose L.
It is left to the reader to convince himself or herself that our strategy succeeds.
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